holding that where intoxication is a defense, prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not lack requisite intent
How later courts described this case
- holding that where intoxication is a defense, prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not lack requisite intent
- concurring opinion by Jones, C.J.
- "The Commonwealth bears a never shifting burden of proving each and every essential element of the crime charged and the defendant need not offer any defense whatsoever."
- similarly discussing the type of evidence necessary to place in issue a defense of intoxication
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Commonwealth v. Boyer, 237 Pa. Super. 341 (1975)
We refuse to apply Rose to all such oases.
The opinion
Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
Like the majority, I am of the view that appellant is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously charged the jury that appellant had the burden of proving intoxication to negate the element of specific intent necessary to a verdict of murder in the first degree.
Further I agree that when the accused places in issue a defense to an element of the crime charged (such as, for example, intoxication or insanity) he assumes no burden of proving that defense. The Commonwealth always has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged; an accused has no burden of persuasion. 1
*395 However, I must note my disapproval of any notion of “sufficiency” of evidence placing intoxication in issue. This sufficiency concept serves no purpose but to obfuscate the true question — whether the issue is in the case.
In my view, the accused has no obligation to introduce any particular evidence in support of his claimed defense. No specific quality or quantity of evidence need be produced. 2 Once the particular defense to an element of the crime charged is in the case — however and by whomever raised — a defendant upon request is entitled to a charge that the jury must acquit if it has a reasonable doubt as to the challenged element of the offense. See McCormick’s Handbook on the Law of Evidence §341, at 802 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
This view is in harmony with the Model Penal Code. Model Penal Code §1.12 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The commentary to that section explains: “When . . . there is evidence supporting the defense (whether presented by the prosecution or defendant), the prosecution has the normal burden; the defense must be negatived by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. §1.12 (formerly §1.13), Comment at 110 (Tent. Draft No. 4,1955). See also 18 Pa.C.S. §308 (1973).
Mr. Justice Mandebino joins in this concurring opinion.
Our state constitution, independently of and similarly to tbe federal constitution, demands no less. See Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222 , 151 A.2d 441 (1959); cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
Of course, the defendant may wish to introduce direct, affirmative evidence to put in issue his defense to an element of the crime. Evidence may, however, come from other sources. It may be found in the Commonwealth’s case in chief or be elicited during cross-examination. See Virgin Island v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1974). It may also appear in the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime charged.