noting that, generally, a “reprimand would suffice,” but that 63 days’ suspension was appropriate for “repeated” uncooperative behavior in violation oí former DR 1-103(C), the predecessor to RPC 8.1(a)(2)
How later courts described this case
- noting that, generally, a “reprimand would suffice,” but that 63 days’ suspension was appropriate for “repeated” uncooperative behavior in violation oí former DR 1-103(C), the predecessor to RPC 8.1(a)(2)
- stating that a repeated pattern of conduct that caused some harm to the administration of justice would violate DR 1-102(A)(4)
- holding that a repeated pattern of conduct that caused some harm to the administration of justice violated DR 1-102(A)(4)
- finding pattern of misconduct where lawyer failed to respond fully and truthfully to 12 separate state Bar inquiries concerning alleged disciplinary violations
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GILLETTE, J.,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the court, but with a reluctance concerning the court’s choice of sanction that I wish to set out separately.
The court today imposes a sanction of a 63-day suspension from the practice of law, but then suspends imposition of that sanction and places the accused on two years probation. The net result is that the accused experiences no actual suspension from the practice of law. The court selects this sanction because, although the accused is guilty of seven *755 different violations of DR 1-103(C) (a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary investigation shall respond “fully and truthfully” to inquiries from the Bar), the accused is not found guilty of any violations of other Disciplinary Rules (DRs). The message we send thereby is that it is not so important to respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from the Bar, as long as the lawyer is not guilty of any violations of other DRs in connection with the matter under investigation.
Since its promulgation in January, 1983, this court has never, so far as I can determine, suspended a lawyer solely for violations of DR 1-103(C). In every case, the accused either has had a history of other disciplinary problems, has been found guilty of violating other DRs in the same proceeding, or both factors have been present. The following examples are illustrative: In In re Chandler, 306 Or 422 , 760 P2d 243 (1988), the accused was suspended for two years, but he had a record of previous disciplinary problems and was found guilty of violating other DRs. The accused in In re Hereford, 306 Or 69 , 756 P2d 30 (1988), was suspended for 126 days after being found guilty only of violating DR 1-103(C), but he also had a record of prior disciplinary problems and was under suspension both at the time he violated DR 1-103(C) and at the time this court found him guilty of those violations. In In re Eads, 303 Or 111 , 734 P2d 340 (1987), the accused was disbarred, but he had a prior disciplinary history and was found guilty of violating other DRs. The accused in In re Vaile, 300 Or 91 , 707 P2d 52 (1985) was suspended for 60 days, but he had violated other DRs in addition to DR 1-103(C). In In re Dugger, 299 Or 21 , 697 P2d 973 (1985), the accused was suspended for 63 days, but he, too, was found guilty of another charge.
We said in In re Hereford, supra, 306 Or at 74, that
“[the] responsibility of a lawyer [under DR 1-103(C)] to ‘respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from * * * other authority empowered to investigate [claims of ethical violations]’ is not less important than a lawyer’s other responsibilities under the disciplinary rules.”
In the present case, we have the opportunity to back up that statement by treating the accused the way I suspect we would in a case of any other course of conduct involving seven different violations of the same DR committed over a period of *756 months in the arrogant manner in which the accused committed them here. In any other such case, I suspect, we would suspend the accused for some period of time. We would better serve the long-term interests of the Bar and the public if we would put teeth in the Bar’s investigatory processes by suspending the accused in this case.
My preference notwithstanding, suspension is not the sanction preferred by the majority of the participating members of the court. I see no purpose in dissenting on the matter, but take this opportunity to note that this is the last time that I, at least, shall join in a sanction less than a suspension for violations of DR 1-103(C) of this magnitude. I hope that publication of this opinion will help to put the members of the Bar on notice that their obligations under DR 1-103(C) are no less serious, and the possible consequences to them for failure to abide by that rule no less dire, than those under other DRs.
Peterson, C. J., joins in this concurring opinion.