Opinion

Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmond

  • 31 Cal. 3d 197
  • 182 Cal. Rptr. 324
  • 643 P.2d 941
  • 1982 Cal. LEXIS 161
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Apr 30, 1982
Status
Published
Author
Kaus
On the bench
Mosk, Kaus, Richardson
Cited by
61 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.0%

noting ambiguities in an initiative "may be resolved by referring to the ballot summary, the arguments and analysis presented to the electorate"

How later courts described this case

  • noting ambiguities in an initiative "may be resolved by referring to the ballot summary, the arguments and analysis presented to the electorate"

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Rider v. County of San Diego, 1 Cal. 4th 1 (1991)

    ” Nonetheless, deeming itself bound by Richmond, the Court of Appeal reasoned that section 4 is inapplicable to districts such as the Agency which have no power to levy a property tax.
    California Supreme CourtDec 19, 1991Read it

The opinion

KAUS, J.

I concur in the judgment.

Although the language of section 4 of Proposition 13 (art. XIII A) is far from clear, the description and discussion of this provision in the election pamphlet which was before the voters suggest to me that the purpose of this section was simply to limit the authority of a city, county or special district to impose new “special taxes” to replace prop *209 erty tax revenue that the city, county or special district lost as a result of the other portions of Proposition 13. (See also Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 208, 230-231 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ]; Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855, 863 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 820 , 616 P.2d 802 ]; County of Fresno v. Malmstrom (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 974, 983 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 777 ].) Given this purpose, it appears sensible under ordinary principles of constitutional interpretation to construe section 4’s reference to “special districts” to apply only to those special districts which had the authority to impose property taxes, for it is only those districts which could suffer property tax losses for which the new special tax revenues would serve as a replacement. 1 Inasmuch as the plaintiff district never had the authority to levy a property tax, I agree with the court that the limitations of section 4 do not apply to it.

Newman, J., concurred.

This definition of “special district” is not unique to this context. As the court notes, a number of statutes explicitly provide that “‘[s]pecial district’ does not include any agency which is not authorized by statute to levy a property tax rate.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2215; Gov. Code, § 16271, subd. (d).)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.