relying on Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), and noting that “state treatment of sovereign immunity is not relevant to a determination of whether a party is immune from § 1983 liability because only federal jurisprudence is controlling on this issue.”
How later courts described this case
- relying on Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), and noting that “state treatment of sovereign immunity is not relevant to a determination of whether a party is immune from § 1983 liability because only federal jurisprudence is controlling on this issue.”
- recognizing that immunity provided to state entities under Kentucky law does not apply to federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
- holding that county judge/executive’s decision to terminate former county corrections department officer was discretionary
- “Howlett [v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990),] states clearly that state treatment of sovereign immunity is not relevant to a determination of whether a party is immune from § 1983 liability because only federal jurisprudence is controlling on this issue.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the disposition and analysis provided by the majority opinion in regard to qualified immunity. Here, qualified immunity is available because the constitutional rights of the plaintiff were not established by the enact *839 ment of a local county government ordinance. In this matter, we must apply federal constitutional law and analysis to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in this jurisdiction or in state courts. There has been created no federal constitutional right in a local government ordinance which addresses local merit board procedures. There is nothing in the ordinance cited which would meet the test of objective legal reasonableness to put the official on notice that a disagreement with the merit board at the time would amount to unconstitutional conduct. The ordinance does not clearly establish rights which are consistent with the Section 1983 analysis found in Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429 (6th Cir.1993).
Accordingly, in the absence of a clearly recognized constitutional right which was established in the manner directed by applicable federal precedent, Jefferson County Judge Armstrong is entitled to qualified immunity. It would appear that at the time he was acting in the best interests of the county and the corrections department in regard to a very difficult employment matter. Armstrong, Bishop and Karsner are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.