stating the Court “may neither rewrite a plainly- written enactment of the [governing body] nor presume that the [governing body] intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating the Court “may neither rewrite a plainly- written enactment of the [governing body] nor presume that the [governing body] intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- stating that a court “may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language”
- holding "a court may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language"
- holding courts "may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
The issue is whether Montclair State University (Montclair State), a nonprofit state college, is entitled to immunity under the Charitable Immunity Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. The Court concludes that it is, relying heavily on the Act’s “plain meaning.”
I emphatically disagree. The Court’s reliance on the Act’s plain meaning collides with the principle that statutes often must be read “sensibly” rather than “literally” to avoid misapplication of the legislative intent. See State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n. 134 N.J. 393, 417-18 , 634 A.2d 478 (1993) (“Despite the literal applicability of the discipline amendment to all public employers whose employees are unprotected by Civil Service ... we are thoroughly convinced that the Legislature did not intend the discipline amendment to apply to the State Police and we now so hold.”).
Because I cannot improve on Judge Havey’s comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion for the Appellate Division, O’Connell v. State, 335 N.J.Super. 427 , 762 A.2d 696 (App.Div.2000), I rely on it completely to support my firm belief that the Act never was intended to apply to nonprofit state colleges. I add only these observations that echo significant aspects of Judge Havey’s analysis.
Although enacted in 1958, apparently the Act rarely, if ever, was relied on by a state college defending a tort claim prior to Graber v. Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 313 N.J.Super. 476 , 713 A.2d 503 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 409 , 719 A.2d 641 (1998). Judge Havey cites cases as far back as 1975 to support his *501 observation that for the past three decades the Attorney General has relied only on the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3 to defend such cases. O’Connell, supra, 335 N.J.Super. at 435 , 762 A.2d 696 . That the Attorney General has assumed these past thirty years that the TCA and not the Charitable Immunity Act governs the tort liability of nonprofit state colleges might give the Court cause for concern about its holding.
Even more troublesome is that simultaneous application of the two statutes is discordant and incongruous. The Charitable Immunity Act provides total immunity for tort claims by “beneficiaries,” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, but permits liability of up to $250,000-for claims against hospitals by beneficiaries; the Act permits unlimited liability for claims by non-beneficiaries, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-8. In all other respects, claims by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are governed by the same legal principles that apply to tort actions involving private citizens. In contrast, under the TCA, even if no statutory or common-law immunity applies, the statute imposes specific conditions on a public entity’s liability. As the Appellate Division cogently observed:
For example, [the TCA]: (1) imposes strict notice requirements, N.J.S.A. 59:8-8; (2) requires proof that the public entity’s conduct was palpably unreasonable, see e.g., N.J.S.A. 59:4-2; and (3) limits recovery for pain and suffering, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2d. Coupling the “beneficiary” defense (N.J.S.A.2A:53A-7) and the limit to recovery (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-8) under the Act with the immunities and conditions of liability imposed by the TCA may present an insurmountable burden for an injured litigant to overcome, and provides the public entity with an imbalanced array of defenses merely because it may be, for example, a nonprofit entity created exclusively for educational purposes.
[O’Connell, supra, 335 N.J.Super. at 436 , 762 A.2d 696 .]
The point is that in the TCA the Legislature comprehensively addressed the conditions under which public entities like Montclair State should be liable in tort, and in doing so expressed not one word suggestive of a legislative intent to supplement those carefully crafted conditions with the immunity provisions of the Charitable Immunity Act passed fourteen years earlier. Moreover, the Legislature afforded Montclair State the opportunity for indemni *502 fication for adverse tort judgments out of the fund created by the TCA. See N.J.S.A. 59:12-1. The Court errs grievously when it, in effect, rewrites the TCA as applied to nonprofit state colleges by superimposing on it the provisions of the Charitable Immunity Act that the Legislature intended to apply only to private nonprofit entities.
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI — 5.
For affirmance — Justice STEIN — 1.