holding that “independent” review “not limited by deference to the trial judge’s discretion” was appropriate for Daubert determinations
How later courts described this case
- holding that “independent” review “not limited by deference to the trial judge’s discretion” was appropriate for Daubert determinations
- noting that the court conducts "an independent, thorough review" and does not "simply ask whether an abuse of discretion was committed"
- Daubert test is more "flexible" than its predecessor, which focused exclusively on a method's general acceptance in the relevant scientific community
- adopting Daubert, we stated Oklahoma imposes additional admissibility requirement only on novel scientific evidence, which uses an uncommon procedure or theory
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHNSON, Presiding Judge,
specially concurring.
First, I want to compliment the Court on a most thorough, incisive and in-depth study of scientific evidence as it relates to DNA profiling evidence and its submission. The Court has conducted a study of 12 O.S.1981, § 2702 as it relates to expert testimony. Both of these in-depth analyses are done with astute logic and legal reasoning.
This Court in Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okl.Cr.1992) and Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655 (Okl.Cr.1991), (both opinions of this writer) discussed Frye and also Section 2702 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Both of these opinions agreed that Frye relates to the general acceptance in the scientific community. These two opinions did not exclude any other test as it relates to the Evidence Code. The Evidence Code, when adopted in Oklahoma, did not mandate the Frye test. To the contrary, the Code indicates that an expert may testify as to any parts of the case that would assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence and to determine a fact or issue. The Evidence Code per se does not require the Frye test.
The opinion is correct when it states (1) that Frye is not required and (2) expert evidence may be offered that would assist the jury in understanding the ultimate fact and issue before the jury.
I personally feel that such evidence may be far reaching, even when the evidence or theo *341 ry may be relatively new in nature. In fact, under proper circumstances, it could be the first time that an expert has ever testified relative to a theory. This, of course, would have to be scrutinized by the court with utmost discretion.
I agree with Professor Whinery as he analyzed 12 O.S. § 2702. He feels that a clarification of the law as it relates to the Oklahoma Standard governing the admissibility of novel forms of scientific evidence and Section 2702 would be helpful. I agree and this opinion does just that (p. 557). The trial courts should remember that in criminal cases a higher standard of proof is required than in civil cases. Care should be given to see that justice is complied with. However, the strict Frye test is no longer the law and the trial court is now free to see that justice can be done with a far wider latitude as to novel scientific evidence provided that same is sufficiently reliable to be held relevant. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me.1978).