plaintiff victim could recover when he grabbed a gun as it dropped out of his hand while he was unloading it, and the gun discharged, where plaintiff alleged that “the hammer had been on the loading notch and that the gun fired after he accidentally pulled the hammer off that notch.”
How later courts described this case
- plaintiff victim could recover when he grabbed a gun as it dropped out of his hand while he was unloading it, and the gun discharged, where plaintiff alleged that “the hammer had been on the loading notch and that the gun fired after he accidentally pulled the hammer off that notch.”
- court rejected defendant’s claim that punitive damage award violated due process because of lack of standards to determine defendant’s culpability, in the “fault-free” contract of strict products liability and in the amount to be awarded which resulted in an arbitrary application
- holding risk of danger to recreational user inherent in design of handgun outweighed benefits of the design
- "[I]f punitive damages could not be awarded in the products liability context, a reckless manufacturer might gain an unfair advantage over its more socially responsible competitors"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Dura Corp. v. Harned, 1985 Alas. LEXIS 279 (1985)
[12] 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979), overruled on other grounds by Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n. 5 (Alaska 1985).
The opinion
BURKE, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I think the trial judge’s refusal to allow the jury to consider Sturm, Ruger’s claim that Day’s injury was due, all or in part, to his own negligence was correct. Thus, on that issue I join in the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague, Senior Justice Dimond. I also disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the jury’s award for punitive damages was the result of passion or prejudice and that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge not to have reduced the award or ordered a new trial.
The trial court instructed the jury that it could return a verdict for punitive damages for injuries caused by a design defect only upon a finding “that [Sturm, Ruger] acted with reckless indifference towards the safety of its customers, or that its acts . were maliciously or wantonly done.” The jury concluded that Sturm, Ruger’s conduct came within that instruction, and the record certainly supports such a conclusion. As to the amount of the award, the formula that the jury apparently used suggests to me that its verdict was the result of careful deliberation and a keen sense of justice, rather than impermissible passion and prejudice.
The evidence showed that Sturm, Ruger manufactured over 1,501,000 revolvers of the type causing Day’s injury. Sturm, Rug-er’s profit from the manufacture and sale of those firearms alone was enormous, to-talling many millions of dollars. At trial, William Ruger, the president and founder of Sturm, Ruger, testified that redesign of the revolver to cure the defect cost approximately $199,000 and that the increased manufacturing cost per revolver was $1.93. The figure agreed upon by the jury as an appropriate award for punitive damages eq-ualled the amount of the increased manufacturing cost per item multiplied by the approximate number of revolvers sold: $1.93 X 1,500,000 = $2,895,000. Thus, the amount of the award is roughly equal to the profit directly attributable to Sturm, Rug-er’s callous disregard for the safety of its customers. Such being the case, I think there is no merit to the contention that the figure was the result of improper passion or prejudice. Certainly, the amount of the punitive damage award far exceeded Day’s actual damages. However, given the purpose of punitive damages, the award was not excessive.
As to all other issues, I concur in the views expressed by the majority. Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the superior court.