Armenta v. Churchill

CARTER, J.

I concur in the judgment of reversal and generally with the reasoning of the majority opinion, but I wish to point out that the holding therein that evidence showing that Dale Churchill had been guilty of some 37 traffic violations including a conviction of manslaughter was inadmissible because defendant Alece Churchill had admitted her liability for all damages sustained by plaintiff in the event that her husband was found to be liable, is directly contrary to the holding of the majority of this court in Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602 [ 248 P.2d 910 ], decided October 9th, 1952, where it was held that the issues of liability and damages were inseparable and that the judgment should be reversed with directions that the case be retried on the issues of both liability and damages even though the trial court had granted a new trial to plaintiff on the issue of damages only. In my dissent in that ease I pointed out that the holding of the majority was directly in conflict with Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 *460 Cal.2d 1 [ 187 P.2d 752 ], It appears that the majority is now relying upon the last mentioned case without even citing the Hamasaki cáse. An analysis of the comparative reasoning in the Puentes ease and the case at bar with the Hamasaki ease makes it clear that the rule for which the majority stand is that where evidence of liability might have the effect of bringing about or increasing an award of damages it is not admissible but if it has the effect of reducing or defeating an award of damages it is admissible. This line of reasoning is out of harmony with my concept of how the law should be administered to achieve equal justice.