concluding that an officer’s obser- vation of “persons who ‘didn’t look right’ putting a paper bag into the trunk of an automobile” was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred
How later courts described this case
- concluding that an officer’s obser- vation of “persons who ‘didn’t look right’ putting a paper bag into the trunk of an automobile” was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred
- explaining that, although experienced police officers can develop “an intui- tive sixth sense” about crime, such instinct and experience cannot “form the entire basis for ‘reasonable suspicion’ ”
- observing that, although ORS 131.615 (1973) attempted to codify Cloman, 254 Or. 1, 456 P.2d 67, and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968
- observing that, although ORS 131.615 (1973) attempted to codify Cloman, 254 Or 1, and Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TONGUE, J.,
dissenting.
In my view, the facts and circumstances of this case, when considered as a whole, were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of ORS 131.615, by which the legislature appears to have established a test more strict than the test established by the United States Supreme Court for purposes of satisfying the requirements of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.
*630 I also dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which now, and for the first time in Oregon, extends the "exclusionary rule” beyond searches in violation of constitutional rights so as to include searches in violation of such statutes — and in doing so not only at a time when the "exclusionary rule” is under increasing attack, but at a time when the apparent trend of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States is to limit, rather than to extend, the application of that rule.
Howell, J., and Bryson, J., concur in this dissent.