explaining that, even though an admission against penal interest is a “‘significant, and sometimes conclusive, reason for crediting the statements of an informant,’ ” admission of a crime, even combined with the fact that the informant was known to the affiant and the magistrate, could not alone provide probable cause
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, even though an admission against penal interest is a “‘significant, and sometimes conclusive, reason for crediting the statements of an informant,’ ” admission of a crime, even combined with the fact that the informant was known to the affiant and the magistrate, could not alone provide probable cause
- finding no probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where, inter alia, “the affidavit [did not] contain any assertion that the informant had been inside the [suspect’s] apartment or that the informant had seen drugs or other evidence in or around [the suspect’s] apartment”
- concluding that the affidavit met the Leon good-faith standard where it stated that a named informant told officers that he had purchased drugs from the defendant's residence earlier that day, even though there were questions about the informant's reliability
- finding that, although the informant was known to the affiant and the issuing magistrate and admitted participating in a crime, the informant’s statements were not reliable because the affiant did not attest to the informant’s reliability
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225 (2011)
557 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 79
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Santana, 962 F. Supp. 2d 906 (2013)
The government argues that the comparison to Higgins is inapposite, because in this case, unlike in Higgins, the anonymous individual stated that he had been inside defendant Soto’s apartment and had seen evidence there in the form of a sawnoff shotgun.
The opinion
*401 KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in Judge Moore’s opinion in all respects but one: I would hold that sufficient evidence supported the district court’s finding of probable cause.
Here, the district court considered five pieces of evidence that, when taken “in the light most likely to support [its denial of the motion to suppress],” United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 607 (6th Cir.2008), support that finding. First, the court knew the informant’s identity. Second, the police found 41 grams of cocaine in the informant’s car. Third, the informant said he picked up the cocaine earlier that day from a specific address, which the police verified to be Higgins’ residence. Fourth, two passengers — when separated and interviewed independently' — said the informant had driven them to Higgins’ residence that day. And fifth, the informant identified Higgins as the seller, and disclosed that he had purchased narcotics from Higgins at that residence on another occasion as well.
This evidence brings the case within the purview of United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 976 (6th Cir.2000). The informant was reliable; he was a “known person”; two independent sources corroborated his statements regarding his whereabouts that day; and the informant admitted to his own prior criminal conduct. There was also a factual foundation for the informant’s claim of witnessing a recent crime: Namely, he was caught red-handed with cocaine, which by his own account he had just purchased from Higgins. Consequently, “a neutral and detached magistrate [could] believe that evidence of a crime [would] be found” at Higgins’ residence, id., and the district court properly denied his motion to suppress.
My disagreement with Judge Moore ultimately does not matter much, since the issue does not affect our disposition of the case. She holds, and I join her in holding, that the Leon good-faith exception applies here.
For these reasons, I join all but section II.A.2.a of Judge Moore’s opinion.