under an insurance policy with a severability clause, separate contracts for coverage exist between the insurer and each separate insured
How later courts described this case
- under an insurance policy with a severability clause, separate contracts for coverage exist between the insurer and each separate insured
- applying Unigard reasoning to automobile insurance policy
- damage resulting from insured's wife's intentional collision with two vehicles held accidental as to insured and covered by policy
- “A loss is ‘accidental’ when it happens without design, intent, or obvious motivation.” (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 11 (1971))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled implicitly by Roller v. Stonewall Insurance, 115 Wash. 2d 679 (1990)
Roller overruled Strong
Distinguished
Distinguished by Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance v. Cross, 103 Wash. App. 52 (2000)
” Strong, 102 Wn.2d at 670. Strong is inapposite because coverage and exclusion in that case were defined in terms of “the insured.
Distinguished by Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Butler, 118 Wash. 2d 383 (1992)
Thus, Strong is inapposite.
The opinion
*677 Pearson,
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with parts I and II of the majority opinion. However, I am unable to fully concur with part III of that opinion wherein the majority remands to the trial court for a determination of whether Federated American Insurance Company (FAIC) has violated the Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86) by engaging in conduct defined as "unfair or deceptive" by WAC 284-30-330, which provides in relevant part:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance:
(6) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(13) Failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
I think it inappropriate to remand this case for a determination of whether FAIC's denial of coverage violated WAC 284-30-330(6). In order to find that FAIC acted in bad faith, the trial court would have to find that FAIC's denial of benefits was "frivolous and unfounded". Miller v. Indiana Ins. Cos., 31 Wn. App. 475, 479 , 642 P.2d 769 (1982). Such a finding would be unsupportable in this case. FAIC's denial of coverage was grounded on genuine public policy concerns. The reasonableness of FAIC's arguments is attested to by the fact that the trial court and Court of Appeals both held in favor of FAIC. I am sure the majority does not intend to characterize the decisions of the learned judges below as frivolous or unfounded. Yet, it seems to me that by remanding this case for a determination of whether FAIC acted in good faith, the majority has done just that.
FAIC's denial of coverage, although it was incorrect, was reasonable. An insurer who reasonably disputes a claim does not act in bad faith as a matter of law. Miller , at 479. *678 Thus, I would limit the scope of the trial court's inquiry on remand to a determination of whether FAIC engaged in the conduct described in WAC 284-30-330(13). The issue of good faith should not be considered.
Utter, Dolliver, and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Pearson, J.