holding that Title VII claim was distinct primary right from defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims under state law
How later courts described this case
- holding that Title VII claim was distinct primary right from defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims under state law
- upholding jury verdict that using racial epithet and recommending termination of plaintiff's employment constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress
- supervisor's racial insults, and his abuse of position to humiliate employee and secure termination for false reasons was outrageous
- use of racial epithet, abuse of position in a manner designed to humiliate the employee, and recommending that the employee be fired for reasons that were not true is outrageous conduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disapproved on other grounds by White v. Ultramar, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19 (1999)
25 Cal.3d 932, 951 , disapproved of on another ground by White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 574, fn. 4
Disapproved on other grounds by People v. Garcia, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (1999)
25 Cal.3d 932, 954, fn. 11 , disapproved on another ground in White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 27 563, 574, fn. 4
The opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
I concur in the judgment, under the compulsion of Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 482 , 598 P.2d 452 ]. But for the majority’s holding in Egan , we might well conclude that employees Johnson and French were not employed in a “managerial capacity,” and that accordingly employer McKee should not have been assessed punitive damages by reason of their misconduct.
Clark, J., concurred.