abrogating Sedeno's requirement that jury instructions must be given whenever any evidence is presented, no matter how weak
How later courts described this case
- abrogating Sedeno's requirement that jury instructions must be given whenever any evidence is presented, no matter how weak
- “ ‘[a]n honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, *439 so that the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter’ ” [emphasis altered]
- overruled on other grounds by People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 324, fn. 5 [149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308] and People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12
- as a mental state, malice cannot coexist with an unreasonable belief by defendant that defendant was defending against imminent bodily harm
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by People v. Martinez, 20 Cal. 4th 225 (1999)
25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 , and abrogated on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 234
Superseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Christian S.
25 Cal.3d 668, 674-675 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Christian S. 6 (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 777
Superseded on other grounds by People v. Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768 (1994)
25 Cal.3d 668, 681 (Flannel), superseded on other grounds as stated in In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 777
The opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
I concur in the judgment and in the lead opinion of Justice Tobriner, except to the extent it announces the new rule that *687 the principles of sua sponte instruction shall apply in future cases to the rule that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend oneself negates malice aforethought and reduces the offense to manslaughter. In my view, we need not and should not reach this question in the present case.
Clark, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.