“[T]he trial court’s discretion to exclude propensity evidence under section 352 saves section 1108 from defendant’s due 9 process challenge”].
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he trial court’s discretion to exclude propensity evidence under section 352 saves section 1108 from defendant’s due 9 process challenge”].
- “[H]arassment cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or 22 trivial[;] rather, the plaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or 23 a generalized nature.”
- “The parties’ briefs, lower court opinions and our own research have disclosed a number of possible resolutions of this postulated internal conflict, all based on the premise [that] the distinction between paragraphs (B) and (D
- “The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the 26 time when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done, or the wrongful result occurs, and 27 13 1 the consequent liability arises.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*16 MOSK, J.
I concur in the majority opinion.
I write merely to concede that no governmental system is without possibility of error or omission.
In People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752 ], I wrote at some length on my own behalf to suggest that the grievous error made in an initiative measure—using “and” instead of “or” in a crucial context—would not have been made if the proposal had advanced its laborious way through the legislative process. I observed that the obvious error “would have been discovered in the traditional legislative process. In an assembly committee, on the floor of the assembly, in a senate committee, on the floor of the senate, in the Governor’s veto opportunity, such inadvertence would likely have been detected, or if the choice of words was deliberate, such intent would have been clearly declared. In an initiative measure, however, no revision opportunity is possible and no legislative intent is available . . . .” (Id. at p. 785 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
In the instant matter, we have an enigmatic result, attributable at least in part to the very legislative process I extolled so enthusiastically in Skinner .
I now reach the inevitable conclusion that no process, however well structured, is certain to be free of potential error or uncertainty. Skinner was one example. The instant case is but another.