Opinion

People v. Alcala

  • 36 Cal. 3d 604
  • 205 Cal. Rptr. 775
  • 685 P.2d 1126
  • 1984 Cal. LEXIS 206
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Aug 23, 1984
Status
Published
Author
Mosk
On the bench
Grodin, Mosk
Cited by
214 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.0%

Superseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Falsetta

rejecting the contention the jury must be instmcted to distrust in-custody informant testimony

How later courts described this case

  • rejecting the contention the jury must be instmcted to distrust in-custody informant testimony
  • in "identity" cases, the "other acts" and the crime charged must be related by "common marks which, considered singly or in combination, support the strong inference that the current crime bears [the defendant's] signature"
  • “Confabulation is a process by which the witness fills gaps in memory with false and imaginary information, often implanted by others, and comes to believe in the truth of his reconstruction”
  • “the corpus delicti of a crime must be proved independent of the accused’s extrajudicial admissions ... A slight or prima facie showing, permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed, is sufficient”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Superseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Falsetta

    36 Cal.3d 604, 626 , abrogated by statute as stated in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911
    California Supreme CourtNov 1, 199916 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsRead it
  • Disapproved on other grounds by People v. Falsetta, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847 (1999)

    36 Cal.3d 604, 623 , disapproved on other grounds by People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911
    California Supreme CourtNov 1, 1999other groundsmedium confidenceRead it

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by People v. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d 543 (1988)

    Defendant correctly observes that Alcala, supra, is factually distinguishable in certain respects.
    California Supreme CourtFeb 25, 1988Read it

The opinion

MOSK, J.

I dissent.

I cannot conclude, with the assurance of my colleagues, that the admission of evidence of prior offenses committed by defendant was erroneous, or that *637 its admission requires reversal under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]. There were sufficient similarities in the prior offenses, all against female children, to permit their introduction on the issue of identity.

That the prior offenses against little girls did not result in a killing is not sufficient justification to find dissimilarity and to conclude that the trial court improperly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence. (People v. McCarty (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 322, 326 [ 330 P.2d 484 ].)

I would affirm the conviction on the ground that there has been no miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)

Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 4, 1984. Mosk, J., and Lucas, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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