stating that the “principle” that the affirmative defense that a claim is barred by the Maryland statute of limitations “may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] ... only applies, however, if all facts necessary to *642 the affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of the complaint” (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that the “principle” that the affirmative defense that a claim is barred by the Maryland statute of limitations “may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] ... only applies, however, if all facts necessary to *642 the affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of the complaint” (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted)
- stating that because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “cannot reach the merits” of such a defense except “in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear|| on the face of the complaint” (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244 , 250 (4th Cir. 1993))
- explaining that defendants must show that potential rejoinder to an affirmative defense was foreclosed by the complaint because otherwise a plaintiff would be required “to plead affirmatively in his complaint matters that might be responsive to affirmative defenses even before the affirmative defenses are raised”
- holding that a plaintiff need not “plead affirmatively in his complaint matters that might be responsive to affirmative defenses even before the affirmative defenses are raised” “except, perhaps, in the unusual case where a claim is filed clearly beyond the applicable limitations period”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WILLIAMS, Chief Judge,
concurring in part:
I join only in Parts I and II of Judge Niemeyer’s opinion. Because it does not “clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint” that the statute of limitations period had expired, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Richmond, Fredericks-burg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir.1993).
Having determined that the district court erred in ruling, based on the complaint alone, that the statute of limitations had expired, I, with respect to my colleagues, believe that we should remand this case for discovery so that the district court may determine when, in fact, the statute of limitations period expired. Instead, the majority of my good colleagues have decided that we should address relation-back under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the district court could “later find[],” ante at 466 (emphasis added), that the statute of limitations period expired before Goodman filed his amended complaint. They have decided to proceed with the inquiry even though we do not know the one fact necessary to address the relation-back issue, that is, whether the amended complaint was in fact filed outside the three-year statute of limitations period. The majority thus reaches the relation-back issue only by hypothesizing that the statute of limitations has expired. I believe this approach is unusual and contrary to Article III of the Constitution as articulated by the Supreme Court’s and this circuit’s precedent. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 , 57 S.Ct. 461 , 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937) (instructing that federal courts are not to give “opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts”); Public Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242, 244 , 73 S.Ct. 236 , 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952) (holding that federal “judicial power does not extend to abstract questions” and the dispute in a particular case “must not be nebulous or contingent but must have taken on fixed and final shape” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 164 F.3d 887 , 891 (4th Cir.1999) (stating that “[ijndisputably ... federal courts ... are prohibited from issuing *476 opinions advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts”, (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted)). Therefore, we should decline to address the Rule 15(c)(3) issue.
The parties want us to address the Rule 15 issue solely to provide guidance to the district court on remand; they admitted as much at argument. 1 The majority grants them this wish; I would not. Cf. Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 , 118 S.Ct. 1694 , 140 L.Ed.2d 970 (1998) (disallowing a party from using the Declaratory Judgment Act “to gain a litigation advantage by obtaining an advance ruling on an affirmative defense”).
Finally, apart from the hypothetical factual underpinning for the majority’s opinion on Rule 15(c)(3), I believe that we should not address the relation-back issue because it is also unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 , 689 n. 10, 124 S.Ct. 1256 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (declining to address a habeas petitioner’s alternative grounds for relief because it was “unnecessary” in view of the court’s grant of the petition on other grounds). For that reason, we should adhere to the “cardinal principal of judicial restraint,” that “if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” 2 PDK Labs., Inc., v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For these reasons, I concur only in Parts I and II of the majority opinion and concur in the judgment.
Judge Shedd has authorized me to indicate that he joins in this opinion.
. Contrary to the majority opinion's attempt to suggest otherwise, this opinion is not inconsistent with the opinions I wrote for the court in United States v. Barile, 286 F.3d 749 (4th Cir.2002), and Resolution Trust Corp. v. Allen, 16 F.3d 568 (4th Cir.1994). Those cases, unlike the majority’s opinion in this case, did not render legal judgments based on hypothetical facts.
. The majority opinion claims that "the relation-back issue ... is much more than something to be decided as a matter of guidance” because "[n]ot deciding the relation-back issue now would leave in place an erroneous decision.” Ante at 466-67 n. 2. I beg to differ. Because the district court’s dismissal of this case was in error, we must vacate that order, leaving no decision that could operate as law of the case.
Furthermore, although the majority opinion asserts that the parties have agreed that relation-back issue will necessarily be in play on remand, the opinion points to nothing in the record or briefs to back up this assertion. And if it could, then Part II of the majority opinion is unnecessary.