discussing “demonstration” that included “reconstruction of events” and “three-dimensional evidence involving the mannequins and dowels that [witness] used to illustrate her testimony” regarding “where the shooters and victims were positioned”
How later courts described this case
- discussing “demonstration” that included “reconstruction of events” and “three-dimensional evidence involving the mannequins and dowels that [witness] used to illustrate her testimony” regarding “where the shooters and victims were positioned”
- describing how the wife had been shot ten times, four of which were to the head, and the husband died from multiple gunshot wounds, including to the chest and face and head, after having been beaten; one of the murderers wore jewelry from the victims to his court proceedings
- holding that a defendant may be held liable for premeditated first-degree murder by acting in concert
- including, among other reasons, failure to maintain eye contact with the prosecutor
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Frye
dissenting.
In State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543 , 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994), this Court held that the trial court erred in its instructions on acting in concert. We held that those instructions were likely to be understood by the jury to permit convicting a defendant of premeditated and deliberate murder, which requires a specific intent to kill, when the only purpose shared between the defendant and the accomplice was to kidnap the victims, and when only the accomplice actually shot and killed the victims with the requisite specific intent to kill. In doing so, this Court resolved an apparent conflict between our opinion in State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110 , 353 S.E.2d 352 (1987) (holding that although it is not necessary for defendant to be actually present in order to be convicted of premeditated and deliberate murder under the acting in concert theory, the requisite mens rea - willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation - must still be shown), and our later decision in State v. Erlewine, 328 N.C. 626 , 403 S.E.2d 280 (1991) (holding that it was not necessary that defendant share the intent or purpose to commit the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury before the jury could apply the law of acting in concert to convict the defendant of that crime). Because the decision in Erlewine created a possible conflict in the law with the decision in Reese , the doctrine of stare decisis had no application in Blankenship. See State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 487 , 83 S.E.2d 100, 108 (1954).
Until today, this Court and, I presume, the lower courts of this State, have followed our opinion in Blankenship . This Court followed Blankenship last year in a unanimous opinion for the Court written by the Chief Justice, when this Court was presented with instructions identical in substance to those in Blankenship and in the instant case. State v. Straing, 342 N.C. 623 , 466 S.E.2d 278 (1996). That opinion contains, in footnote 1, the following statement: “The author of *253 this opinion dissented in State v. Blankenship. Although the author of this opinion still believes that Blankenship was wrongly decided, he is now required by stare decisis to apply that precedent in the case sub judice.” 342 N.C. at 627 , 466 S.E.2d at 280 . However, today, the Chief Justice writes for a majority of the Court, ignoring stare decisis and overruling a recent opinion of this Court which resolved an apparent conflict in the law by returning to the principles articulated in Reese .
As we have said, “[t]his Court has never overruled its decisions lightly. No court has been more faithful to stare decisis.” State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402, 410 , 432 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1993) (quoting Rabon v. Hospital, 269 N.C. 1, 20 , 152 S.E.2d 485, 498 (1967)). “This Court has always attached great importance to the doctrine of stare decisis, both out of respect for the opinions of our predecessors and because it promotes stability in the law and uniformity in its application.” Wiles v. Construction Co., 295 N.C. 81, 85 , 243 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978) (citations omitted).
Although the doctrine of stare decisis will not be applied to preserve and perpetuate error and grievous wrong, see Rabon v. Hospital, 269 N.C. at 15 , 152 S.E.2d at 498 , that is not what is involved here. The majority states no good or sufficient reasons for departing from this Court’s precedent in Blankenship and Straing , and I see no new conditions or superior reasoning in the majority’s opinion which would justify this Court’s ignoring the doctrine of stare decisis. A proper regard for stare decisis and the adherence to case precedents required by that doctrine compel me to follow the law established in Reese, Blankenship, and Straing .
The acting in concert instructions in the instant case are identical in substance to Straing and, as the majority concedes, are identical in substance to those found defective in Blankenship . Nevertheless, today, in this death case, the majority now overrules Blankenship and concludes that the trial court’s instructions were not erroneous. I believe that Blankenship was properly decided and, in any event, I am now required by stare decisis to apply that precedent in the instant case. Accordingly, I must register my dissent to this opinion which overrules a case that I thought had settled the law in a manner that was easily understood by our trial court judges.
Justices WHICHARD and PARKER join in this dissenting opinion.