explaining that under § 146 of Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, in action for personal injury, local law of state where injury occurred determines rights and liabilities of parties, unless with respect to particular issue, some other state has more significant relationship
How later courts described this case
- explaining that under § 146 of Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, in action for personal injury, local law of state where injury occurred determines rights and liabilities of parties, unless with respect to particular issue, some other state has more significant relationship
- “[W]e now hold that a non-severability provision contained in a legislative enactment is construed as merely a presumption that the Legislature intended the entire enactment to be invalid if one of the statutes in the legislation is found uncon *630 stitutional. When a non-severability provision is appended to a legislative enactment and this Court invalidates a statute contained in the enactment, we will apply severability principles of statutory construction to determine whether the nonseverability provision will be given full force and effect.”
- "The provisions contained in W. Va. Code § 55 -7B-6d (2001) were enacted in violation of the Separation of Powers Clause, Article V, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, insofar as the statute addresses procedural litigation matters that are regulated exclusively by this Court pursuant to the Rule-Making Clause, Article VIII, § 3 of the West Virginia Constitution. Consequently, W. Va. Code § 55 -7B-6d, in its entirety, is unconstitutional and unenforceable."
- “A constitutional issue that was not properly preserved at the trial court level may, in the discretion of this Court, be addressed on appeal when the constitutional issue is the controlling issue in the resolution of the case.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALBRIGHT, Chief Justice,
concurring:
(Filed July 6, 2005)
I concur with the result in this case but pause to offer some words of caution. The authority relied upon by the majority regarding the non-severability clause is quite tenuous. I fear the reasoning employed by the majority creates serious potential for mischief. On the other hand, the use by the Legislature of a so-called “non-severability” clause — especially on a regular basis — has equal or even greater potential for mischief.
In this case, I would have preferred that the Court postpone the issuance of the mandate in order to give the Legislature the time needed to reconsider whether it truly desired to have its entire enactment on medical malpractice fail because it had inadvertently strayed into an area of constitutional responsibility reserved to this Court. For this reason I concur with reservation.