Edwards v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.

Deen, Judge,

dissenting. I dissent from the first division of the opinion where the majority holds that as a matter of law the insurance company is relieved of all liability on a landlord and tenant liability policy because, although the insured absentee owner gave immediate notice on being contacted by the estate of the alleged victim, after consultation with his attorney he took no action on a third party report that a drunk man, not even known to be a tenant, had fallen off the fire escape of one of the buildings.

Under the policy terms the insured’s duties are three: (a) to give written notice of every "occurrence,” (b) to forward every demand, claim or suit and (c) to cooperate in the defense. The company relies here solely on failure to give notice of an "occurrence.” The insured replies that the knowledge was hearsay in the first place; in the second place it appeared that the person was trying to enter another person’s apartment by way of the fire escape, and in the third place there is testimony that the insured did not realize the extent of the injuries. As it appeared to him at that time, no liability on his part toward the person on the fire escape was involved. Had the insurance company received the same information at that time, it does not appear that the situation would have changed, the insured’s position improved, any prejudice to the investigation avoided, or any other reason for *309 cutting off the protection to which the insured was otherwise entitled by the payment of his premium and issuance of the policy.

Further, the fact that this is a jury question has been decided in Norfolk &c. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cumbaa, 128 Ga. App. 196 (2) ( 196 SE2d 167 ). That was a personal injury inflicted by the plaintiff directly, under a homeowner’s liability policy which required notice of any "incident... as soon as practicable,” where notice was not given for 19 months after the accident. This is a personal injury resulting from an act of the decedent, the landlord tenant liability policy requiring notice of any "occurrence ... as soon as practicable,” where notice was given five months after the accident and immediately on notice to the insured of a possible claim. In that case it was held: "The time limitations in policies of insurance requiring a report of incident 'as soon as practicable’ are subject to a factual determination. 'The questions of the sufficiency of the excuse offered, and the diligence of the beneficiary in giving the notice after the removal of the disability, are generally questions of fact, to be determined by the jury, according to the nature and circumstances of each individual case.’ North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Watson, 6 Ga. App. 193, 196 ( 64 SE 693 ); Pilgrim Health &c. Ins. Co. v. Chism, 49 Ga. App. 121 (3) ( 174 SE 212 ); Hulme v. Mutual Benefit &c. Assn., 60 Ga. App. 65 ( 2 SE2d 750 ).”

"An accident that an ordinarily prudent individual acting reasonably would consider, under all circumstances, as inconsequential, and which would not afford the basis of any claim, the insured was not bound to report. . . even though it may prove afterwards to result in serious injury.” Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Anderson’s Groves, Inc., 176 F2d 246, 247.

"Generally the question of whether notice has been given without unnecessary and unreasonable delay is one of fact for the jury.” 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 4734, p. 26. Among other questions are: "If there was a delay, what was the reason for it — and was the excuse a matter which might justify an ordinary man, not one skilled in insurance matters or in the law, in such delay; and was the insurer still able reasonably to secure the facts available through a prompt investigation, and was it not unreasonably hampered in efforts to settle, or at least any more than it would have been in the inception of the claim. As we have seen, the courts continue to lean more to the view that no defense arises if there has been no prejudice, but place the burden upon the one seeking recovery to demonstrate this lack of prejudice. On the other hand, if the excuse is valid, or the notice in fact reasonable, *310 under one of the first two of the matters suggested herein for determination, then prejudice is immaterial. These, accordingly, are almost always factual in character and would be difficult to resolve as matters of law.” Id., p. 29.

I respectfully dissent from the opinion holding the insurer entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on its refusal to defend the case, particularly where the insured acted on advice of counsel and his position appears eminently reasonable as a matter of fact, simply on the ground that the policy written by the company and construed in its favor amounts in effect to a forfeiture of all rights. Forfeitures not being favored by the law, and matters of fact being involved, I would reach an opposite conclusion.

I am authorized to state that Judge Evans concurs in this dissent.

Evans, Judge, dissenting. I fully concur in the lucid and persuasive dissent written by Judge Been, and add the following:

1. No damage whatever resulted to the insurer by reason of not receiving the report of injury at an earlier time.

2. The language of the policy must, of course, be construed most strongly against the insurer. The "notice” provision does not require the insured to advise the insurer of each and every event that comes to the attention of the insured by hearsay. To the contrary, the insured is only required to give notice "in the event of an occurrence,” meaning the actuality of an occurrence, and not merely that the insured has heard second-hand that an event (of injury) may have occurred.

3. The report of injury is a part of the cooperation feature of the policy, which the insurer required of the insured. Recently this court considered this question, and a majority — the writer and 3 other Judges dissenting — erroneously held that a higher degree of cooperation is required than is actually required by law, thus failing to follow earlier precedents of this court. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, and held that failure to cooperate is not a valid defense unless it be shown that such failure is a wilful failure to cooperate. See Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot, 126 Ga. App. 799 ( 191 SE2d 870 ), reversed by the Supreme Court in Proudfoot v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Ga. 169 ( 196 SE2d 131 ).