holding that in applying a “borrowed” statute of limitations period, court must consider not only such statute itself, but also any applicable tolling statutes as well
How later courts described this case
- holding that in applying a “borrowed” statute of limitations period, court must consider not only such statute itself, but also any applicable tolling statutes as well
- reversing jury award of $300,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages on a claim that her boyfriend was grossly negligent when he infected her with gonorrhea because complaint was untimely
- agreeing that but for Wyoming's borrowing statute dating back to territorial laws, the statute of limitations of the place where the action is brought, rather than where the cause of action arose would apply
- “A cause of action accrues only when forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THOMAS, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result in this case that was reached by the majority of the Court. I would, however, reach that result in a different manner. In my view this action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations of the District of Columbia (§ 12-301, D.C.Code Ann. (1973)), which is the place where the cause of action arose and to which we are directed by § 1-3-117, W.S.1977. The District of Columbia, like our state, follows a discovery rule with respect to the accrual of an action in tort. Grigsby v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 428 F.Supp. 242 (1975); affirmed, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 270 , 543 F.2d 417 (1976). In the Grigsby case the court concluded that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff knew, or through the exercise of due diligence could have known, that she had a claim that her injuries were caused by a defect in the defendant’s product. That knowledge was acquired upon her examination by a physician in October even though in Grigsby’s instance she had symptoms manifesting injury in August. It was not until the examination by her physician in Washington, D. C., that Margaret Housen knew of her injury, and prior to that time all of the elements of the cause of action in tort were not present. No injury to the plaintiff could be demonstrated prior to that examination, and in any other jurisdiction we must speculate as to the occurrence of any injury.
I am impressed with the reference in the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion to A.L.I. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 377 (1934), which sets forth the rule as follows:
Ҥ 377. The Place of Wrong.
“The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.”
As I understand the thrust of the majority opinion that place is determined to be the state of New York. Included within § 377 is a section entitled “Summary of Rules in Important Situations Determining Where a Tort is Committed.”, and included within that section is a rule set forth as follows:
“2. When a person causes another voluntarily to take a deleterious substance which takes effect within the body, the place of wrong is where the deleterious substance takes effect and not where it is administered.
“Illustration:
“2. A, in state X, mails to B in state Y a package containing poisoned candy. B eats the candy in state Y and gets on *354 a train to go to state W. After the train has passed into state Z, he becomes ill as a result of the poison and eventually dies from the poison in state W. The place of wrong is state Z.”
This illustration seems peculiarly applicable tc the factual situation herein in which the infection could have been transmitted in any one of a number of states. The plaintiff did not manifest any symptoms of the disease, and the illness was identified in Washington, D. C., upon physical examination. I have no quarrel with the general discussion of the law relative to statutes of limitations set forth in the majority opinion, but those concepts are designed to reach a degree of certainty in the law, albeit arbitrarily. Their application in this instance identifies the District of Columbia as the place of the wrong.
The application of the District of Columbia statute is consistent with views this Court previously has expressed in Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29 , 269 P.2d 302 (1954); Brown v. Riner, Wyo., 500 P.2d 524 (1972); and Cantonwine v. Fehling, Wyo., 582 P.2d 592 . Even if one should turn to the more modern “substantial relationships” test set forth in A.L.I. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, §§ 145, 146 (1971), the result would be the same. According to § 146 of that work the law of “ * * * the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties * * *.” Section 145 lists the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to a tort situation, and none of them result in any other state having a more significant relationship to the occurrence and these parties than the District of Columbia. Some of these factors have no application at all under this set of circumstances.
In this particular instance since the selection of the District of Columbia avoids any speculation with respect to the facts, and because of the suggestions in the several treatises, including those cited and discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions, I would select as the place of injury the District of Columbia. Applying its statute of limitations which begins to run upon discovery of the illness, I would hold that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.