holding that the results of a lie detector test are admissible in evidence where the parties have entered into an express stipulation to that effect
How later courts described this case
- holding that the results of a lie detector test are admissible in evidence where the parties have entered into an express stipulation to that effect
- results of a polygraph examination are admissible upon an express stipulation of the parties that the results shall be admissible as evidence for the jury to attach to them whatever probative value they may find them to have
- "We acknowledge that doubt exists as to the complete reliability of lie detector tests, and we share at least a modicum of that doubt. Operators may be unskilled, and results may be ambiguous and subject to arbitrary characterization."
- polygraph examiner’s testimony that defendant was lying in denying the crime admissible
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Bowles, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. An express stipulation of the parties that the results of a polygraph test shall be admissible in evidence does not in my opinion make the results competent evidence. The majority opinion suggests that these scientific devices may have improved in recent years sufficiently to now aid in the search for truth. Certainly there may have been improvements both in the machines themselves and in the abilities of various examiners. I note, however, that the decisions cited in the majority opinion deal with the result being admitted by agreement only and there is practically no authority, statutory or otherwise permitting such evidence to be introduced by a party as a *82 matter of right. My personal experience from many long years at the bar leads me to appreciate many, many faults with polygraph results and procedures, and little or no tangible benefits. I cannot agree that evidence of any kind has probative value merely because counsel for both parties stipulate as to its admissibility. The courts of many states agree. State v. Corbin, 285 S2d 234 (La. 1973); Lewis v. State, 500 SW2d 167 (Tex. 1973); Romero v. State, 493 SW2d 206 (Tex. 1973); Pulakis v. State, 476 P2d 474 (Alaska 1970); Conley v. Commonwealth, 382 SW2d 865 (Ky. 1964); People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302 ( 189 NE2d 260 ) (1963); Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606 ( 50 NW2d 172 ) (1951); Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416 ( 8 NW2d 288 ) (1943). Courts are usually reluctant to exclude any matter consented to by both parties. This is based on the basic principles of fair play. However, polygraph results have not been demonstrated as reliable. I cannot feel comfortable leaving the guilt or innocence of an individual based on "evidence” which almost every court in America has concluded is lacking as competent evidence because of insufficient scientific reliability. Defendants do not know or understand the trustworthiness. Jurors are not experts and usually have had little or no experience along these lines. On the other hand, juries could be greatly persuaded in one direction or the other by such unreliable scientific evidence. To approve its use, in my opinion, is a step backward in the judicial process.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.