holding that in some cases where the plaintiff alleges failure to warn under both negligence and strict liability theories, to avoid confusion the jury should be instructed only on the strict liability claim
How later courts described this case
- holding that in some cases where the plaintiff alleges failure to warn under both negligence and strict liability theories, to avoid confusion the jury should be instructed only on the strict liability claim
- noting that the objective of the rule of strict liability with respect to dangerous products focuses on adequacy of the warning given by supplier, or necessity of the warning, while negligence under § 388 focuses on supplier’s conduct
- failure of employer who has actual knowledge of hazard to warn employees may constitute a superseding cause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Soule, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part)—I concur in the result. I agree that the State of Washington recognizes that a manufacturer's liability may be established on a theory of strict liability by virtue of inadequate warnings. Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wn.2d 474 , 573 P.2d 785 (1978); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wn. App. 379 , 550 P.2d 71 (1976). It was therefore error to so phrase the interrogatories that the jury could not base a verdict upon this theory. I also agree that the doctrine of superseding cause should be considered in the event of a retrial.
I dissent from that portion of the decision which holds that upon retrial the theory of negligence should have no place in the proceedings.
Petition for rehearing denied June 8, 1978.
Review granted by Supreme Court November 3, 1978.