finding the Department's procedures for conducting major disciplinary hearings, in which an inmate's liberty interest is at stake, comport with the due process requirements articulated in Wolff; recognizing an inmate's right to present a defense at a disciplinary hearing, including documentary evidence and witness testimony; but observing Department procedures require that disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) preside over disciplinary hearing and record and justify his rulings
How later courts described this case
- finding the Department's procedures for conducting major disciplinary hearings, in which an inmate's liberty interest is at stake, comport with the due process requirements articulated in Wolff; recognizing an inmate's right to present a defense at a disciplinary hearing, including documentary evidence and witness testimony; but observing Department procedures require that disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) preside over disciplinary hearing and record and justify his rulings
- holding that SCDC’s disciplinary and grievance procedures are consistent with constitutional standards delineated in Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), which established the minimum constitutional requirements for procedural due process when an inmate is disciplined for “serious misconduct”
- holding that, aside from two non-collateral matters specifically listed in the PCR Act, PCR is a proper avenue of relief only when the applicant mounts a collateral attack challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence as authorized by section 17-27-20(a)
- holding that appellant has the burden of showing that an error was prejudicial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FINNEY, Chief Justice:
I write separately to explain that while I have decided to concur in the result reached here, I do so with great reluctance. I join the majority only because we need to bring finality to this confused area of the law, and not because I agree with the method chosen here. In my view, the majority opinion is fundamentally flawed in that it simply ignores the third clause of S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-20(a)(5) (1985), which provides for a post-conviction relief action to be brought by one claiming that “... he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint.” Without doubt, this provision encompasses claims such as those brought by petitioner and other inmates challenging conditions of confinement. In the interest of judicial harmony, however, I reluctantly concur in the result reached by the majority.