holding that the court may grant defense counsel’s motion for a continuance over defendant’s objection if necessary “in the administration of justice” for pretrial preparation
How later courts described this case
- holding that the court may grant defense counsel’s motion for a continuance over defendant’s objection if necessary “in the administration of justice” for pretrial preparation
- holding that trial court properly granted defense counsel’s request for a continuance, even over defendant’s objection, to allow more time to prepare for trial and ensure effective representation and a fair trial
- holding no abuse of discretion when granting defense counsel’s request for a continuance over defendant’s objection because the continuance was necessary for defense counsel to effectively represent the defendant given the case’s complexity and length
- allowing continuance over defendant’s objection where “Campbell’s counsel could neither effectively represent him nor ensure that he received his constitutional right to a fair trial within 60 days of arraignment, ‘through no fault of their own but because of the complexity and length of this case.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*51 Pearson, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with the majority in affirming the aggravated murder conviction. I further concur with Justice Utter's dissent, except that part which states that a review of mitigating circumstances is impossible under the current statute.
The death penalty statute provides adequate guidance as to the "nature and function of mitigating circumstances". See State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 647 , 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) (Bartholomew II). Therefore, it is my judgment that this court is able to review adequately whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to merit leniency.
However, I concur with Justice Utter's analysis that the statute allows the prosecutor to make discretionary decisions as to when and why the death penalty will be sought, yet does not provide a mechanism for adequate review of those decisions by this court. We are therefore unable to undertake a meaningful proportionality or passion review. This issue was not considered in State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wn.2d 173 , 654 P.2d 1170 (1982) (Bartholomew I), or Bartholomew II.
Accordingly, I too would hold that the statute is void for vagueness under the due process clause. I would remand for sentencing to life in prison without the possibility of parole pursuant to RCW 10.95.090. See Bartholomew I, at 214-16.
Williams, C.J., concurs with Pearson, J.
After modification, further reconsideration denied December 28, 1984.