remanding case for new trial on one offense alternative when there was insufficient evidence of another that was charged, and it was impossible to know whether the jury had unanimously determined guilt based on the first
How later courts described this case
- remanding case for new trial on one offense alternative when there was insufficient evidence of another that was charged, and it was impossible to know whether the jury had unanimously determined guilt based on the first
- explaining the question is not whether reviewing court finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence but whether any rational trier of fact could have
- reversing and remanding where the defendant was convicted of aggravated first degree murder under alternative theories of rape or kidnapping and there was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping charge
- when there is sufficient evidence to support only one of two alternative means, only the sufficiently supported means is "left" to support the conviction and it is impossible "to know whether the jury deemed that [means] established in the absence of some indication of jury unanimity"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006)
94 Wn.2d 216, 221 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L. Ed. 2d 466
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Rice, 246 P.3d 234 (2011)
¶ 30 To the extent Rice's arguments rely on State v. Pettitt, 93 Wash.2d 288, 609 P.2d 1364 (1980), and State v. Green, 91 Wash.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979), adhered to in part on recons., 94 Wash.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980), these cases are distinguishable.
Distinguished by State v. Vladovic, 99 Wash. 2d 413 (1983)
Green is inapposite in the instant case since, as discussed above, the restraint of the four employees was a separate act from the robbery of Mr. Jensen.
Distinguished by State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816 (1982)
Green is inapposite here, it
The opinion
Dolliver, J.
(concurring in the result) — While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I cannot concur with its view that our substantial evidence rule is somehow different from the standard expressed by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 , 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). Nor can I agree we must adopt the Jackson rule because of our language in Green I, State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431 , 588 P.2d 1370 (1979).
The Supreme Court in Jackson stated, at page 319:
[T] he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Jackson rule was adopted to replace the "no evidence" rule of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , 4 L. Ed. 2d 654 , 80 S. Ct. 624 , 80 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1960). Under the no evidence rule, a conviction based upon a record wholly devoid of any relevant evidence of a criminal element of the offense charged is constitutionally infirm.
The court in Jackson , however, stated that the court is not required to " 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Jackson , at 318-19. This is exactly what we said in Green I, at page 443: "In determining whether the necessary quantum of evidence exists, it is unnecessary for the [reviewing] court to be satisfied of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
In Jackson , the United States Supreme Court, and in Green I, this court, both have said it is not the role of the court to be satisfied of the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The question raised by the two cases is whether the substantial evidence rule as articulated in *241 State v. Randecker, 79 Wn.2d 512 , 487 P.2d 1295 (1971), and followed in Green I, conflicts with the rational-trier-of-fact/beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule of Jackson .
Justice Rosellini has clearly and succinctly demonstrated in his dissent that there is no distinction between the two rules. If, after an examination of the record, the reviewing court is "satisfied that there is 'substantial evidence' to support either the State's case, or the particular element in question" (Randecker, at 518), this is sufficient to meet the Jackson test that a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson , at 319. See also People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557 , 606 P.2d 738 , 162 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1980), for a post-Jackson case in which the California Supreme Court upheld its "substantial evidence" rule as being "plainly consistent" with Jackson .
The view of the majority needlessly abandons the substantial evidence rule. We have never said the Jackson rule and the substantial evidence rule are different. We have said only that a rule requiring the reviewing court to be satisfied itself of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not the same as the substantial evidence rule. The United States Supreme Court concurs. We have not previously adopted the rule of the majority; neither has the United States Supreme Court, nor should we now.