The opinion
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Justice, dissenting.
While I agree with the majority’s analysis in this case, I disagree with its disposition. Because I would affirm the circuit court’s order for reaching the right result, albeit for the wrong reason, I respectfully dissent. My review of the circuit court’s order granting Rule 37 relief reveals that the circuit court’s ruling in this matter complied with the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1994), in that the circuit court found that defense counsel’s performance was deficient and that defense counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Brown’s defense:
The previously-asked questions then must be addressed: Was defense counsel’s performance deficient; and, was the deficiency such that the Defendant’s rights were prejudiced?
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The first question must therefore be answered in the positive.
The second question must also be answered in the positive.
As correctly stated by the majority, the State urges that the circuit court’s finding that Brown was prejudiced as a result of defense counsel’s deficient performance was clearly erroneous. Also correct is the fact that we will not reverse a circuit court’s grant of postconviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous. Here, the evidence presented at Brown’s Rule 37 hearing demonstrated that, at the very least, Brown could have refuted H.M.’s testimony regarding the date of the act by calling Jim Robinson as an alibi witness, had he 114had possession of the calendar. We have long held that issues of credibility are to be left to the jury and that the trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. See Wallace v. State, 2009 Ark. 90 , 302 S.W.3d 580 (2009). With that in mind, I cannot say that the jury in a new trial would not have had reasonable doubt regarding Brown’s guilt, and, accordingly, I would hold that defense counsel’s deficient performance clearly prejudiced Brown’s defense.
While the circuit court may have reached its decision regarding the prejudice prong using a different analysis than this court would have had it do, the circuit court nonetheless reached the right result — that Brown was prejudiced by his defense counsel’s deficient performance. Thus, the circuit court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous. Even where we have disagreed with a circuit court’s reasoning, we have affirmed, for a different reason, the circuit court’s ruling for reaching the right result, see Rollins v. State, 362 Ark. 279 , 208 S.W.3d 215 (2005), and we should do the same here.
GUNTER, J., joins.