Opinion

Coleman v. State

  • 246 S.W.3d 76
  • 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 155
  • 2008 WL 313818
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Feb 6, 2008
Status
Published
Author
Keller
On the bench
Cochran, Meyers, Price, Womack, Johnson, Holcomb, Keller, Keasler, Hervey
Cited by
62 cases
Authority
More cited than 6.9%

concluding that the various factors supported the trial court’s decision to retain the attorneys pro tem, including that “the two attorneys pro tem had spent over twenty-one months researching, investigating, and preparing this case for a trial that was then imminent”

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that the various factors supported the trial court’s decision to retain the attorneys pro tem, including that “the two attorneys pro tem had spent over twenty-one months researching, investigating, and preparing this case for a trial that was then imminent”
  • stating that “[t]he decision not to modify the order appointing the attorneys pro tem was within the trial court’s sound discretion and we will not disturb that decision absent an abuse of discretion.”
  • holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove the attorney pro tem under the circumstances presented it
  • distinguishing an article 2.07 attorney pro tern from a special prosecutor

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

KELLER, P.J.,

filed a concurring opinion in which KEASLER and HERVEY, jj., joined.

I agree that the trial court did not err when it refused to modify the order appointing the attorneys pro tem. I do not join the Court’s conclusion that that decision was “within the trial court’s sound discretion.” 1 Saying the trial court has “discretion” suggests that the trial court may have the power in this type of situation to act contrary to the wishes of the district attorney-a proposition that is at least questionable. 2 In this case, we need not resolve whether the trial court could ever act contrary to the wishes of the district attorney regarding whether to withdraw an attorney pro tern’s appointment. The outgoing district attorney had recused himself, and the incoming district attorney has not attempted to rescind that recusal. With these comments, I concur in the Court’s judgment.

. See Court's op. at 12.

. See State ex rel. Eidson v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1, 4-7 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (plurality op)(recusal of district attorney is a matter solely within the discretion of the district attorney).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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