holding that “[f]or purposes of the robbery statute, it is immaterial whether appellant ever intended to use physical force”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[f]or purposes of the robbery statute, it is immaterial whether appellant ever intended to use physical force”
- noting that “[f]or purposes of the robbery statute, it is immaterial whether appellant ever intended to use physical force against -5- [another] to further his escape”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Karen R. Baker, Judge, concurring. I must regretfully concur with the majority opinion because appellant does not raise or argue the fact that the Wal-Mart theft-prevention employee had no authority to arrest or detain appellant; therefore, since the employee had no authority to apprehend Mr. McElyea, appellant could not have been guilty of resisting apprehension.
In Akins v. State, 253 Ark. 273 , 485 S.W.2d 535 (1972), the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and dismissed a conviction for escape holding that where an appellant ran away from police officers, but he was not in lawful custody, he could not be guilty of escape. In that, case, a detective with the Little Rock Police Department stopped the appellant on the street, showed him his badge, and told the appellant that he was under arrest for investigation of vending-machine burglaries. The court explained that no public offense was committed in the presence of the officers, defendant was not arrested in obedience to an arrest warrant, and the officers had no reasonable grounds for believing defendant had committed a felony; therefore, defendant was not in lawful custody at the time he ran away and thus, was not guilty of escape.
In the case before us, the employee is a private citizen. A private citizen has authority to arrest another pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1(b) (2004) and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-106 (d) (Repl. 2003). Section 16-81-106(d) provides that a private person may make an arrest where he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony. Under this statute and the described circumstances, an officer acting outside his jurisdiction has the authority to effect an arrest. See Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100 , 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990) (where the supreme court recognized the statutory principle in § 16-81-106(d)), but concluded Perry had been arrested on a misdemeanor, making the arrest invalid).
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.1(b) provides in pertinent part that:
“a private person may make an arrest where he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony.”
Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-81-106 provides in relevant part:
(a) An arrest may be made by a certified law enforcement officer or by a private person.
(b) A certified law enforcement officer may make an arrest:
(1) In obedience to a warrant of arrest delivered to him; and
(2) (A) Without a warrant, where a public offense is committed in his presence, or where he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony.
(B) In addition to any other warrantless arrest authority granted by law or court rule, a certified law enforcement officer may arrest a person for a misdemeanor without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed battery upon another person and the officer finds evidence of bodily harm, and the officer reasonably believes that there is danger of violence unless the person alleged to have committed the battery is arrested without delay.
(c)(1) A certified law enforcement officer who is outside his jurisdiction may arrest, without warrant, a person who commits an offense within the officer’s presence or view, if the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor.
(d)A private person may make an arrest where he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony.
Therefore, a private citizen may apprehend a person only where he has reasonable grounds for believing the person committed a felony. A police officer cannot arrest an individual for misdemeanor theft unless the offense was committed in full view of the officer who witnessed the public offense. Because the Wal-Mart theft-prevention employee was a private citizen, he had no authority to arrest appellant; accordingly, appellant could not have been resisting apprehension.