explaining that summary judgment is not available in post-judgment vacation proceeding, but uncontested post-judgment issues when properly identified may be settled by summary process
How later courts described this case
- explaining that summary judgment is not available in post-judgment vacation proceeding, but uncontested post-judgment issues when properly identified may be settled by summary process
- finding no civil remedy for plaintiff’s allegations that opposing counsel committed fraud, deceit, perjury, and spoliation of evidence during an earlier, separate trial
- remedies for litigation-related misconduct must be pursued in the litigated case, or by criminal or bar-discipline proceedings
- "Although a few jurisdictions have adopted the tort of spoliation, most of the courts which have considered the issue have refused to recognize spoliation as an independent cause of action in tort."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SIMMS, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 1 I agree with the majority that no civil remedy for the alleged litigation misconduct is available and I concur in affirming the trial courts dismissal of Patel III, case number 89,582. Additionally, I agree with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the judgment in Patel I, case number 90,489. That judgment was final and plaintiffs allegations in support of her vacation petition, even if proven, were insufficient to sustain her action and the trial courts decision in her favqr. I would not remand the matter for an additional hearing, however. Instead I would reverse the trial courts judgment in favor of Patel and direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff bore the burden to prove her case. See e.g. Gavin v. Heath, 125 Okl. 118 , 256 P. 745 (1927). She had the opportunity to establish her case but, by any and all measures, she failed to do so, and the *1204 trial courts ruling in her favor was clearly an abuse of discretion. The defendants motion to dismiss should have been sustained. The majority’s stated concern with the denial of a sufficient opportunity for defendants to put on their case in defense of the petition to vacate is, therefore, strained and unconvincing and lends no credence to this disposition. The majority errs in granting Patel this additional chance to try and make her case against defendants, and I fear this “new” view of fraud created here to govern the trial on remand will create much confusion in this previously settled area of law.