observing that case law on the overall rate of return applies to the rate of return on common equity and that rates must be “as low as may be reasonably consistent with” due process (cleaned up)
How later courts described this case
- observing that case law on the overall rate of return applies to the rate of return on common equity and that rates must be “as low as may be reasonably consistent with” due process (cleaned up)
- “Given th[e] subjectivity ordinarily inherent in the determination of a proper rate of return on common equity, there are inevitably pertinent factors which are properly taken into account but which cannot be quantified with the kind of specificity here demanded by [the appellant].”
- testimony of two witnesses, despite conflicting testimony of other witnesses, constitutes substantial evidence in support of the findings of fact
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice MEYER
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Carolina Utility Customers Assoc., 323 N.C. 238 , 372 S.E. 2d 692 (1988), i.e., for the failure of the Commission to justify and quantify the magnitude of the variances dictated by the non-cost factors upon which it relied to justify the rate discrimination which it approved.
The majority is apparently satisfied that the Commission has taken to heart our admonition and is moving progressively, though at a painfully slow pace, to eliminate or significantly *506 reduce the substantial discrimination between the various classes of customers caused by the subsidization of certain classes of customers by other classes and the very substantial difference between the rate of return for the various classes of customers approved by the Commission and those which would be dictated by cost-of-service studies. As to the cities in particular, while it is true that in the two most recent NCNG rate cases, the Commission has placed all or most of the rate increases on the classes other than the municipal customers, I believe faster progress toward the goal is warranted.
I also join Justice Martin’s dissenting opinion as to the Commission’s rewarding the company through the rate structure for the standard of management required of it by the General Statutes.
I vote to reverse the Commission’s order or to remand the case for reconsideration of the issues of rate discrimination and rate of return on common equity.