The opinion
TAYLOR, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I concur in the conclusion reached. But, I do not concur in holding that “the court properly sustained the objection .of plaintiffs’ counsel,” to the question asked 'plaintiff as to why he objected to the proposed vacation of a portion of Locust Street. The street could not be vacated without his consent, and his failure to give such consent was inconsistent with his claim for damages for failure of defendant to deliver a part of the land, which the vacation would have given him. 70 C.J., Witnesses, sec. 797(3). Would the plaintiff prefer money damages to the land? Or did he want to postpone the vacation of the street until he obtained maximum damages, and thus get both? The motive of a witness, where material, is always a proper subject of inquiry on cross-examination. 70 C.J., Witnesses, sec. 805(10). And even if immaterial where it affects credibility. “Any question, although irrelevant or remote, may be put if it reasonably tends to explain, contradict, or discredit any testimony given by him, or to test his accuracy, memory, veracity, or credibility.” 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, sec. 626, p. 347.
This court has held that a wide latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of witnesses. Johnson v. Richards, 50 Idaho 150 , 294 P. 507 ; In re Estate of Brown, 52 Idaho 286 , 15 P.2d 604 ; Lyon v. Melgard, 66 Idaho 599 , 163 P.2d 1019 . This rule is especially applicable where the witness is a party to the action. Just v. Idaho Canal etc. Co., Ltd., 16 Idaho 639 , 102 P. 381 ; Tawzer v. McAdams, 134 Kan. 596 , 7 P.2d 516 ; 70 C.J., Witnesses, sec. 828. The court should have allowed the plaintiff to answer.