holding that court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear pre-conviction application for writ of habe-as corpus that was filed by applicant while applicant was on deferred adjudication community supervision even though trial court did not rule on application until after applicant was adjudicated guilty
How later courts described this case
- holding that court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear pre-conviction application for writ of habe-as corpus that was filed by applicant while applicant was on deferred adjudication community supervision even though trial court did not rule on application until after applicant was adjudicated guilty
- holding that court had jurisdiction to hear pre-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus that was filed by applicant while applicant was on deferred adjudication community supervision even though trial court did not rule on application until after applicant was adjudicated guilty
- holding that trial court did not lose jurisdiction to hear appellant’s pre-conviction writ application once that court adjudicated him guilty
- stating that “[a] defendant’s sworn representation that his guilty plea is voluntary ‘constitute[s] a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings’” (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLER, P.J.,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion but write separately to comment on certain published opinions relied upon by the State, and by the Court of Appeals’s dissent, in arguing that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of applicant’s pre-conviction habeas application. These cases are Ex parte Branch, 1 Martinez v. State, 2 Saucedo v. State, 3 and Hubbard v. State, 4 , which all address not jurisdiction, but the doctrine of mootness. 5
This case differs from these mootness cases. Branch held that the return of an indictment rendered moot the question of probable cause to hold the defendant, 6 and MaHinez held that a conviction rendered moot a complaint regarding bail because the defendant was “no longer subject to pre-trial confinement.” 7 Essentially, these types of claims apply only at certain stages of the prosecution, and they disappear once the prosecution progresses past the stage in question. By contrast, the habeas claim in the present case purports to undermine the validity of the conviction, and so does not disappear after conviction like complaints regarding probable cause or bail.
Saucedo and Hubbard are more like the present case. They too addressed claims that did not disappear with the imposition of conviction. 8 But in both cases, the courts held that the claims need not be addressed in an appeal from habeas proceedings because they could be raised in an appeal from the conviction itself. 9 The Saucedo court derived this holding from the proposition that “an application for writ of habeas corpus should not be entertained where there is an adequate remedy *666 at law.” 10 Even if we were to adopt the holdings of these lower court decisions, this case would be distinguishable because the claim here (an attack on the voluntariness of the plea in a plea bargain context) would, for various reasons, be barred from consideration in an appeal from the adjudication of guilt. 11 The only other avenue for raising appellant’s claim would be a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus. If the choice is simply between habeas proceedings now and ha-beas proceedings later, the availability of those later proceedings cannot really be said to render the timely-filed pre-conviction habeas proceedings moot. 12
With these comments I join the Court’s opinion.
. 553 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
. 826 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
. 795 S.W.2d 8 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.).
. 841 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
. Mootness can implicate jurisdiction, but only to the extent of the Texas Constitution’s implied prohibition against advisory judicial opinions. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442-443 (Tex.1998).
. 553 S.W.2d at 381 .
. 826 S.W.2d at 620 .
. Saucedo, 795 S.W.2d at 9 ("Appellant raises several issues which may be suitable for consideration on appeal of his conviction.”); Hubbard, 841 S.W.2d at 33 (double jeopardy question).
. Saucedo, 795 S.W.2d at 9 ; Hubbard, 841 S.W.2d at 33 .
. 795 S.W.2d at 9 ; see also Hubbard, 841 S.W.2d at 33 (citing Saucedo ).
. See Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Tex R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 42.12, § 5(b).
. See Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783 (Tex.Crim.App.2001)(recognizing a defendant’s ability to litigate a pre-conviction habe-as application at the same time as the revocation hearing and to carry the issue up on appeal). In its brief, the State complains that appellant filed his habeas application in the original criminal action instead of as a separate proceeding. This complaint was not discussed in the Court of Appeals’s opinion nor was it raised in the State’s petition. Consequently, I will not address it here.