upholding a disciplinary board’s finding that petitioner violated his oath and duties as an attorney where he argued in a brief that the appellate judges acted "unlawfully” and “illegally” in reversing a trial court judgment in favor of petitioner’s clients
How later courts described this case
- upholding a disciplinary board’s finding that petitioner violated his oath and duties as an attorney where he argued in a brief that the appellate judges acted "unlawfully” and “illegally” in reversing a trial court judgment in favor of petitioner’s clients
- rejecting “the argument that ‘outrageous’ and ‘unwarranted’ statements concerning a justice ... were protected by ‘free speech’ considerations”
- upholding sanction where attorney made false statements about judges based solely on conjecture without investigating whether the allegations were factually substantiated
- the court has jurisdiction to discipline member attorneys for defamation or disrespectful statements contained in pleadings or other court papers; “outrageous” and “unwarranted” statements concerning a judge or justice are not protected by “free speech” considerations
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*427 BIRD, C. J., Dissenting.
I find the sensitivity of the court to the sensibilities of judges quite touching, but if taken to its logical conclusion rather dangerous. With today’s decision this court has removed from the protections of the First Amendment any statement by a lawyer commenting on a member of the judiciary.
These are difficult and unpleasant times. The amenities and courtesies of language and demeanor seem to be absent from our social and business environments. One would hope for a kinder and more thoughtful world. However, censorship is not the best method by which to achieve that end.
I might be more sympathetic to the view of my colleagues that we begin the process of censoring the briefs of trial and appellate counsel by threatening them with discipline if our own house were in order. What was said here on behalf of a litigant is not materially different from what some judges and justices have been known to have said about each other or about members of the bar. (See A lesson in Yiddish (Aug. 1980) Cal. J., p. 309. See also, for example, the characterizations by justices in their published opinions regarding their fellow justices as collected by Justice Newman in his dis. op., ante, at pp. 415, 419.) Does the majority suggest that we begin the process of curtailing the First Amendment rights of judges and justices by filing charges against our colleagues when they use less than judicious language when speaking about each other?
The chilling effect this decision will have on the actions of a lawyer is too high a price to pay for the fragile sensibilities of a judge or justice. Further, it smacks of arrogance to so limit the bar while we ourselves carry on dialogues which match or exceed what was said here.
I respectfully dissent.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied December 10, 1980. Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Newman, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.
*428 APPENDIX A
Glenn D. Ramirez
ATTORNEY AT LAW
• 14 WALNUT STREET
P O. BOX 3SS
KLAMATH PALLS, OREGON B7B0I
August 1, 1977
Honorable Robert K. Puglia
Honorable Leonard M. Friedman
Honorable Edwin J. Regan
Judges of the Court of Appeals
Courts and Library Building
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Judges:
I am writing to apologize for language in my recent Reply Brief which lead counsel for the State Bar Association to conclude that I intended "that the judges received money to render a decision against your client,---". Such was not intended either directly or indirectly. The sole basis of the Terrys’ civil rights case against you is that you went beyond the record including transcripts, briefs, and arguments and took away a Court and Jury finding, verdict, and judgment, reinstated a voided security obligation against his property and foreclosed him from a new trial by limiting the issue on retrial to a minor issue which had been substantially qualified in his first trial.
I am extremely sorry for improper innuendo or inferences that may have taken the words used beyond the above intent, and I am this date asking the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for permission to delete from the Terrys1 Reply Brief, language that would lead to these improper conclusions. My apologies and sorrow goes to you personally and the judicial profession generally, as I personally do not believe that the conclusions drawn by the State Bar Counsel happen except in extremely isolated incidents.
Had these matters been brought to my attention by your counsel, the offending words would have been withdrawn forthwith long ago to have avoided any injurious reference.