stating that a defendant’s evidence “may be considered . . . [only] where it clarifies and is not contradictory to the State’s evidence or where it rebuts permissible inferences raised by the State’s evidence and is not contradictory to it” (citations omitted; emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- stating that a defendant’s evidence “may be considered . . . [only] where it clarifies and is not contradictory to the State’s evidence or where it rebuts permissible inferences raised by the State’s evidence and is not contradictory to it” (citations omitted; emphasis added)
- holding that although it is not necessary for defendant to be actually present in order to be convicted of premeditated and deliberate murder under the acting in concert theory, the requisite mens rea - willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation - must still be shown
- holding that events occurring outside the defendant’s presence, including the arrival of defense counsel at the scene of the interrogation, have no bearing on defendant’s capacity to understand and validly waive a constitutional right
- while "several jurors apparently changed their minds when the district attorney's questions became more specific," record provided no general reason to believe these jurors would have subsequently given defendant different answers; therefore, no abuse of discretion
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184 (1997)
319 N.C. 110, 144-45 , 353 S.E.2d 352, 371-72 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds -6- STATE V. MCDARIS Opinion of the Court by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 233 , 481 S.E.2d 44, 71
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Montgomery, 331 N.C. 559 (1992)
We conclude that Reese and Cutler are distinguishable from the present case.
The opinion
Justice Mitchell
dissenting.
I believe that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder on the theory of premeditation and deliberation as well as on the felony murder theory and that the sentence of death was properly entered. I would find no error in either the guilt or sentencing phases of the defendant’s trial and would proceed to the proportionality review required of this Court in capital cases. Therefore, I dissent.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, as it must be on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the evidence here was sufficient to support a reasonable finding by the jury that the defendant participated in the killing of the victim and did so in a premeditated and deliberate manner. The victim unequivocally indicated to law enforcement officers that two people had done “it.” *150 The jury quite reasonably could have found that the “it” the victim referred to was the stabbing and her imminent death, not a few dollars being taken from the store. Indeed, if the defendant’s statement is believed, it is questionable whether the victim ever knew that anything had been taken from the store. According to the defendant’s version of the events, he did not take anything from the store until the victim had been stabbed several times and lay helpless on the floor.
The victim’s statement must be viewed in light of the physical evidence that she had been stabbed numerous times but that there were no stab wounds to her hands or arms to suggest she had been able to raise them to shield herself. Additionally, marks on her neck indicated that she had been severely strangled.
In my view, the victim’s statement is direct evidence that two people inflicted the wounds which caused her death. The defendant’s own statement supports a finding that he and his accomplice were those two people. The physical evidence supports a reasonable finding that the defendant either stabbed the victim himself or strangled her while his accomplice stabbed her. Evidence that the defendant knew before he entered the store that the victim could identify him and his efforts after the crime to conceal evidence also support a reasonable finding that he knew at the time he entered the store he would take the victim’s life. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to take the charge against the defendant to the jury on the theory of premeditated and deliberate murder.
Since I believe that the defendant’s conviction on the theory of premeditated and deliberate murder was proper, I also must reject the majority’s view that the jury could not consider the fact that the murder occurred during an armed robbery as an aggravating factor for sentencing. The majority’s holding in this regard is based entirely upon its conclusion — erroneous I think— that the murder charge could only be submitted on a felony murder theory, and that the underlying felony of armed robbery could not be considered as aggravating. Again, I do not agree.
Finally, I reject the majority’s view that there was no competent evidence to support the aggravating factor that the killing in this case was committed to avoid a lawful arrest. The majority is in error when it states that the only evidence relied upon to sup *151 port this factor was the killing itself. The evidence showed that the defendant was well acquainted with the victim of the murder and knew that she would be working at the store on the evening in question. The defendant was concerned specifically about the fact that the victim would be able to identify him. The finding of the jury in the present case that the defendant engaged in the murder to prevent detection and lawful arrest was reasonable in light of the evidence that, despite his concern that the victim would identify him, the defendant went ahead and participated in the robbery and killing. Such evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable finding that prior to the robbery and killing the defendant had formed the intent to kill the victim in part at least to avoid detection and arrest.
This case is easily distinguishable from State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394 , 284 S.E. 2d 437 (1981), relied upon by the majority, wherein the only evidence of this aggravating factor was the defendant’s general expression, after the crime had been completed, indicating that he did not want to be apprehended. I do not believe that Williams is any authority for the holding of the majority that this aggravating factor was improperly submitted and found in the present case.
As I find no error in either the trial or sentencing of the defendant, I would so hold and proceed to address the question of whether the sentence of death is disproportionate in the present case. Since the majority holds that the case must be remanded for errors committed during the trial and sentencing phases, however, it would serve no useful purpose for me to discuss the proportionality issue here.
I respectfully dissent.
Justice Martin joins in this dissenting opinion.