holding that trial court erred in excluding evidence of alleged prior false accusations by the victim, who had claimed that men other than the defendant engaged in similar sexual misconduct with her but later recanted many of those allegations
How later courts described this case
- holding that trial court erred in excluding evidence of alleged prior false accusations by the victim, who had claimed that men other than the defendant engaged in similar sexual misconduct with her but later recanted many of those allegations
- holding that prior false accusations of sexual offenses are admissible to attack the victim’s credibility and substantively to prove that the present offense did not happen
- reasoning that such “evidence does not involve the victim’s past sexual conduct but rather the victim’s propensity to make false statements regarding sexual misconduct”
- concluding that “the evidence does not involve the victim’s past sexual conduct but rather the victim’s propensity to make false statements regarding sexual misconduct”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part by State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117 (2019)
259 Ga. 135, 137 ( 377 SE2d 158 ) (1989), overruled in part by State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hodges v. State, 229 Ga. App. 475 (1997)
Smith also is inapplicable; Hodges was not charged with any sexual offense.
The opinion
Hunt, Justice,
concurring specially.
As to Division 2, I agree that an expert’s testimony that a particular victim in a child abuse case is being truthful is inadmissible. However, it is entirely permissible for an expert on child abuse to testify about the typical characteristics of child abuse victims. See Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612 ( 277 SE2d 678 ) (1981). The expert may testify that the victims do not, in general, lie about the abuse. This is an evaluation, based on scientific study, which is not within the ken of the average juror. See State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448 ( 349 SE2d 684 ) (1986). It is then the jury’s duty, aided by the expert’s opinion regarding the general propensity for victims of child abuse to be truthful *139 about the abuse, to determine whether the particular victim is truthful.
Decided March 16, 1989
Reconsideration denied March 29, 1989.
Jerry C. Gray, for appellant.
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, for appellee.