holding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that a motorist would lose consciousness, causing his vehicle to smash through the rooftop parking facility and land on the street below
How later courts described this case
- holding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that a motorist would lose consciousness, causing his vehicle to smash through the rooftop parking facility and land on the street below
- stating that proof of proximate cause is "essential to recovery" in a negligence case
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. Although there exists legitimate criticism 1 on the subject of “cause v. condition”, I recognize that it is still a viable analysis of proximate cause in Oklahoma. I believe it is misapplied in this action for defective design of an architect.
Such liability by an architect has been recognized in other jurisdictions. 2 By here relying upon our confusing, although traditional, examination, we may be unintentionally eliminating a whole area of design de-feet litigation on the eve of its birth, particularly as to safety devices. There are many safety devices in our modern world which have been created to protect us, at least partially, from injury in situations where negligence-either our own or another’s-may be reasonably anticipated. Many of us rely on these devices. The most obvious example is the automobile seat belt. Seat belts are provided-by law-in automobiles because it is believed by those who should know about such things, that wearing a seat belt greatly reduces the risk of serious injury in certain types of accidents. Most automobile accidents occur by reason of the negligence of one or more drivers. If a driver faithfully buckles up, is involved in an accident and is severely injured because his seat belt fails due to defective design, is there liability for that defect? Examination of the legal issues and determination of the policies are not helped by reliance on a “cause v. condition” approach.
Additionally, while the majority purportedly rejects the issue of duty as the determining factor here, the opinion appears to me to conclude, not that the curb and wall were not the proximate cause, but that owners (and architect) had no duty to build an impregnable wall around the parking area which would be sufficiently strong to stop plaintiff’s car which was traveling at an obviously high rate of speed.
It has been observed that because foreseeability comprises an element to be considered in determining the existence of duty as well as a factor to be weighed in evaluating proximate cause, the two are often con *397 fused. 3 I believe that has happened here. It should be observed that the Schatz decision upon which the majority primarily relies, holds that a store owner has no duty to foresee that a car will run into the store and injure a customer and therefore had no duty to erect barriers to keep cars out.
While the majority speaks in terms of “proximate cause”, the true issue decided is whether or not there was a duty which was allegedly breached.
I am authorized to state that Justice Williams joins me in this dissent.
. Reynolds, Proximate Cause What if the Scales Fell in Oklahoma? 28 Okl.L.Rev. 722 (1975); W. Prosser, Prosser on Torts, 247-248 (4th Ed.).
. See, e. g., Annot., Architect’s Liability for Defective Design, 97 A.L.R.3d 455 ; Liability of Design Professionals-The Necessity of Fault, 58 Iowa L.Rev. 1221 (1973); Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifications, 55 Calif.L.Rev. 1361 (1969); Annot., Products Liability-Defective Design, 96 LLR 3d 22.
. See, e. g., Reynolds, supra, n.l at 724 and Prosser, supra, n.1. at 236, 244-246, 250, 267, 282 -285.