cause of action “accrued” at time plaintiff obtained knowledge, or reasonably should have obtained knowledge, of tort committed upon her person by defendant
How later courts described this case
- cause of action “accrued” at time plaintiff obtained knowledge, or reasonably should have obtained knowledge, of tort committed upon her person by defendant
- unlike malpractice claims, ‘other tort actions * * * are normally immediately ascertainable upon commission of the wrong.’
- “To say that a cause of action accrues to a person when she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time, that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an action before she knows she has one. To say to one who has been wronged, “You had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy,’ makes a mockery of the law.”
- explaining the difficulty in inferring legislative intent from inaction
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Lesch v. DeWitt
245 Or. 307, 309 , 421 P.2d 996 (1966), superseded by statute as stated in Lesch v. DeWitt, 118 Or. App. 397
Distinguished
Distinguished by Whalen v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc., 256 Or. App. 278 (2013)
Nonetheless, defendants argue that the discovery rule does not apply here for two reasons: (1) the text of ORS 12.110(1) does not create a discovery rule for battery claims and (2) the discovery rule articulated in Berry and its progeny is inapplicable to battery claims because those claims are “inherently discoverable.
The opinion
McALLISTER, C. J.,
dissenting.
For the reasons stated by Lusk, J., in Vaughn v. Langmack, 236 Or 542 , 390 P2d 142 (1964), I dissent.