holding that legislative research assistant's termination following her alleged violation of informal public neutrality requirement was “an administrative rather than a legislative act” and “therefore not within the scope of legislative immunity”
How later courts described this case
- holding that legislative research assistant's termination following her alleged violation of informal public neutrality requirement was “an administrative rather than a legislative act” and “therefore not within the scope of legislative immunity”
- rejecting the argument the State waived its legislative immunity argument by not asserting it in the proceedings below and stating, "the failure to raise this defense at trial does not necessarily constitute a waiver of immunity" (citing Sup.Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 730 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980))
- “[I]f counsel does not ask to poll the jury, or object to excusing the jury or to the filing of the verdict, the right to challenge the consistency of the verdict is waived.”
- discussing federal law of immunity as applied to constitutional torts
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BURKE, Chief Justice,
concurring.
On the issue of the legality of Haley’s termination, I would affirm the superior court’s judgment on independent state grounds.
Article I, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution provides: “Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” This language is far more explicit than that contained in the free speech *323 clause of the federal Constitution: “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. As stated in Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1978), a case interpreting a provision similar to Alaska’s article I, section 5, the language of the state constitution “is clear and certain, leaving nothing to conjecture, and requiring no interpretation, construction or clarification.” 1 The right of every person, including Haley, to speak on all subjects is guaranteed. There are no exceptions, although sanctions may be imposed for an abuse of that right. See, e.g., Webb v. State, 580 P.2d 295, 302 (Alaska 1978) (lies told to the police by an accomplice after the fact to the crime of murder not protected).
It is difficult to understand how one can abuse the right to speak by the mere exercise of that right. Even more difficult to understand is how the right can be abused by one’s refusal to promise not to exercise it at some future time. The cause for Haley’s discharge, however, appears to have been nothing more that a combination of these reasons. 2 Apart from the fact that she spoke, and refused to promise not to speak again, on a subject considered controversial by her employer, Haley said and did nothing that could be characterized fairly as an abuse of the right guaranteed her by article I, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution.
Otherwise, I concur.
. What amounts to an "abuse” of the right to speak under article I, section 5 does require interpretation of that term. The identity of those possessing the right ("every person”) and the nature of the right itself (to "speak on all subjects”), however, are matters upon which there can be no disagreement.
. For purposes of this decision, I have assumed that Haley was terminated for both reasons.