holding that under certain circumstances, “judicial economy may be maximized by returning the case to the trial court upon the appellate court’s discovery that the trial court relied on an erroneous legal theory or reasoning,” and that the decision whether to pursue such a course “must be left to the appellate court’s discretion”
How later courts described this case
- holding that under certain circumstances, “judicial economy may be maximized by returning the case to the trial court upon the appellate court’s discovery that the trial court relied on an erroneous legal theory or reasoning,” and that the decision whether to pursue such a course “must be left to the appellate court’s discretion”
- holding that appellate courts retain discretion in determining whether to apply the right-for-any-reason rule and consider alternative legal theories not addressed by the trial court, or to vacate order and remand for the trial court to consider alternative legal theories in the first instance
- holding that appellate courts have discretion in whether to apply right for any reason rule to address grounds raised in a summary judgment motion, upon which the trial court has not ruled
- explaining that an appellate court has discretion to return “the case to the trial court [to] allow the trial court to issue rulings on grounds advanced, which could then serve as a basis for appellate review”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by National Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41 (2003)
275 Ga. 834 (573 SE2d 369) (2002), is inapplicable to this appeal as, this being an equity case, the trial court sat as the trier of fact.
The opinion
SEARS, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
I tend to agree with much of the reasoning of the majority opinion. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s attempt to reconcile the right for any reason rule with the notion that an appellate court cannot affirm a trial court’s ruling if it was based upon an erroneous legal theory. I believe that appellate courts generally have an obligation to affirm a grant of summary judgment under the right for any reason rule., even if the trial court relied upon an erroneous legal theory. I also believe that appellate courts may decline to review any issue that has not been ruled upon by the trial court if that issue has not been adequately briefed and/or argued by the parties on appeal.
*840 I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this special concurrence.