providing one analysis for the claim that the retained jurisdiction pi-o-gram created a liberty interest under Idaho and United States Constitutions
How later courts described this case
- providing one analysis for the claim that the retained jurisdiction pi-o-gram created a liberty interest under Idaho and United States Constitutions
- providing one analysis for the claim that the retained jurisdiction program created a liberty interest under Idaho and United States Constitutions
- concerning a decision to relinquish retained jurisdiction
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001)
99 Idaho 382, 385 , 582 P.2d 728, 731 (1978) overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 , 30 P.3d 293
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)
” State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 143, 814 P.2d 401, 403 (1991) citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384-85, 582 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 388, 825 P.2d 482, 485 (1992).
The opinion
BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
When Ditmars was before the court I concurred on my understanding that the court was there holding that probation was not involved in a district court’s retention of 120 days jurisdiction in passing sentence. Months later in a subsequent case I pointed out an ambiguity in that respect, as to whether execution of sentence was in fact suspended in retaining 120 day jurisdiction, but otherwise still of the belief that the court in Ditmars reached its decision in that case on the basis that probation was not the guiding, or any factor. My own understanding was that the statute allowing a district court to retain jurisdiction for 120 days was to place the court in a position similar to that which a district court occupies in a misdemeanor case, or where sentence on a felony is commuted to a jail sentence — the court being open to entertain such motions as an incarcerated defendant may make. Absent a retained jurisdiction, a trial court is powerless to alter a sentence which he has imposed committing a defendant to the State Board of Correction.
Now, just short months after Ditmars, the court perceives that the retention of 120 day jurisdiction is a probationary type of arrangement. I am in agreement with a change to that view, but cannot see any reason for not over-ruling Ditmars to the extent that it is inconsistent with the court’s pronouncements handed down today.
Where a majority of the court are presently of the view to adopt the due process procedures set forth in Justice Donaldson’s opinion, I concur, doing so on the basis that what is tendered the 120 day inmate is far superior to that which he has enjoyed. In time, however, I cannot help but think the full court will come around to the position espoused by Justice Bakes.