agreeing to impose duty of care on landowners, yet recognizing that it would be exceedingly difficult to imagine how defendant could have corrected condition and therefore predicting defendant would most likely not be found liable
How later courts described this case
- agreeing to impose duty of care on landowners, yet recognizing that it would be exceedingly difficult to imagine how defendant could have corrected condition and therefore predicting defendant would most likely not be found liable
- private possessor of land is no longer immunized from liability for harm caused to persons outside his premises by the natural condition of his land
- "[T]he courts are moving toward jettisoning the common law rule in its entirety and replacing it with a single duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of property."
- “[T]he duty to take affirmative action for the protection of individuals coming upon the land is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*374 RICHARDSON, J.
I concur in the judgment of the court which reverses the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of respondents. It seems proper to require that landowners act reasonably with reference to their property, thus preventing damage to their neighbors. This is so regardless of whether the condition threatening the injury or damage is artificial or natural.
I think, however, that it is unfortunate that this salutary principle of tort law which is consistent with, but an extension of, our holding in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 , 32 A.L.R.3d 496 ], is expressed within the circumstances alleged in this case. I find it exceedingly difficult to imagine what respondents reasonably could have done to prevent or reduce the damage caused by the natural condition here present.
It is apparently conceded by all parties that the damage caused in the case before us consisted of a landslide triggered by unseasonably heavy rains falling on an active landslide area. This area is very large, very deep and very old. It is characterized by unstable soil which, when it slides, accretes a toe at the edge of the Pacific Ocean. The toe, which helps to hold back the upland soil, is, in turn, subject to wave action by Pacific waters which weakens it. When the rains are heavy and the toe is thus weakened, there are periodic slides. This land subsidence has been continuing apparently for aeons in the area between respondents’ property and the Pacific Ocean. The instability of the soil is an ancient geological phenomenon widely known and accepted by the inhabitants of the area. No activity by respondents contributed in any manner to the slide or to the damage. Any corrective measures would have involved the properties along the entire width of the slide area, only a small portion of which extends onto respondents’ land. Under the foregoing circumstances, described by the majority as “close,” I am unable to conjure what, if any, restraining engineering procedures reasonably could be required of respondents.
Nonetheless, I agree that appellant should be entitled before a fact finder to explore the propriety of respondents’ conduct referrable to the geological condition.