The opinion
ROSSMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the foregoing opinion with the exception of the parts which hold that a license of the kind involved in this proceeding can not be terminated except by procedure which complies with all of the demands of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is clear to me that this case calls for no expression of views concerning that matter. The parties submit no issue as to whether or not the cancellation of a license requires notice and a hearing. The majority opinion itself says: “We now direct our attention to the only issue presented, namely, the sufficiency of the pleadings.” At a later point the majority emphasize that statement by saying: ‘ ‘ The only question for our determination relates to the sufficiency of the complaint,’’.
*96 Section 54-932, O.C.L.A., subdivisions (c) and (d), makes express provision for notice to the accused and a hearing for him as prerequisites to the cancellation of his license. Subdivision (h) even says:
“In any hearings conducted under this section, the accused shall be granted the right to appear in person or by attorney, to introduce testimony in his behalf. He shall also have the right to have witnesses, books, papers and documents subpenaed for him by the board upon due application.”
Thus, the statute itself complies with the demands of due process. It is freely conceded that the accused was given notice and was afforded a hearing in which he participated, not merely personally, but also by counsel.
This case is devoid of any issue as to whether or not the cancellation of a license must be effected by procedure which complies with the demands of due process. I think that we ought to withhold an opinion upon that subject until a case is submitted which calls for an expression of our views. The chances are that when a case of that kind is submitted, the issue will be briefed and fully argued.