holding that a claim for unjust enrichment "is neither in tort nor contract but is described as a claim in quasi contract or a contract implied in law. A quasi contract or a contract implied in law is not a contract. The claim is not based on a promise but is imposed by law to prevent an unjust enrichment. If there is a contract between the parties the contract governs the claim and the law will not imply a contract."
How later courts described this case
- holding that a claim for unjust enrichment "is neither in tort nor contract but is described as a claim in quasi contract or a contract implied in law. A quasi contract or a contract implied in law is not a contract. The claim is not based on a promise but is imposed by law to prevent an unjust enrichment. If there is a contract between the parties the contract governs the claim and the law will not imply a contract."
- holding that the testimony of the plaintiff's bookkeeper "as to what was billed for the materials and labor and the evidence of a payment for a part of it at the billed rate is evidence sufficient for the jury to find the reasonable value to the defendants of the remaining goods and services for which bills were submitted and no payment was made"
- explaining that “[i]f there is a contract between the parties, the contract governs the claim and the law will not imply a contract,” making unjust enrichment, which relies on a “contract implied in law,” inapplicable
- explaining restitution is a remedy for unjust enrichment, and the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application when “there is a contract between the parties that governs the claim”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. Talford, 214 N.C. App. 196 (2011)
Though we find the above distinction dispositive, we also note that the facts in Environmental Landscape and Booe are distinguishable from the facts in the present case.
The opinion
Justice Meyer
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority that plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of the reasonable value of the services for which he sought to hold defendants accountable on a quantum meruit theory.
“Damages are never presumed. The burden is always upon the complaining party to establish by evidence such facts as will furnish a basis for their assessment, according to some definite and legal rule.” [Lie 6 v. Mayer, 244 N.C. 613, 616 , 94 S.E. 2d 658, 660 (1956).] The amount to be paid is not the value of the services to the recipient, nor should his financial condition be taken into consideration in determining the value of the services performed. Many factors serve to fix the market value of an article offered for sale. Supply, demand, and quality (which is synonymous with skill when the thing sold is personal services) are prime factors. The jury, when called upon to fix the value, must base its decision on evidence relating to the value of the thing sold. Without some evidence to establish that fact, it cannot answer. To do so would be to speculate.
Cline v. Cline, 258 N.C. 295, 300 , 128 S.E. 2d 401, 404 (1962) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs evidence as to the value of the services performed for defendants was, quite simply, paltry. The majority concludes that the “substantial quantity of materials and labor” furnished to defendants after their last payment to plaintiff “was obviously of value.” I do not quarrel with this conclusion. However, it is the value of those materials and labor, not merely their quantity, for which plaintiff must produce some evidence, as a basis for the jury’s award. This he signally failed to do.
*573 It is not sufficient, as the majority holds, to introduce a totalled bill together with evidence from plaintiffs bookkeeper as to the amounts paid and unpaid by defendants. The fact that defendants have paid invoices in the past is no evidence at all of the value of services rendered and materials furnished at a later time. Plaintiff must do more than merely allege an amount and its reasonableness. If he makes no effort to compare his figures of value in terms of the type of work done or the number of hours worked, or to correlate the value of his work and materials furnished to any community or industry standard, then he has failed to carry his burden and the evidence is inadequate to support more than an award of nominal damages. The record is devoid of documentation to support the figures plaintiff claims. The business records which allegedly formed the basis for the bookkeeper’s testimony were not introduced at trial. There is no evidence concerning the plans and specifications which plaintiffs workers followed, nor is there evidence of the number of hours they worked or at what wage. The invoices for materials that plaintiff sent to defendants were not introduced at trial. In short, the underlying documentary evidence necessary to assist the jury in making a reasoned valuation of the goods and services for which plaintiff claimed was never introduced.
Plaintiffs evidence here consisted of a brief description of the work performed, the amounts he claims defendants owe him and opinions that the quality of his work is good. Once the jury had decided to award damages to plaintiff, it had nothing but an assumption — that the labor and materials for which defendants had not paid were of the same relative value as those for which they had paid — on which to base its award. This is pure speculation. Cline v. Cline, 258 N.C. 295 , 128 S.E. 2d 401 . Because plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support the sums he claimed, he is entitled to no more than nominal damages. I would vote to affirm the Court of Appeals.
Justice MITCHELL joins in this dissenting opinion.