attorney’s failure to appear at first day of criminal trial due to alleged conflict with another case, coupled with his unsatisfactory explanation for his failure to proceed with trial after being ordered to, treated as a direct contempt
How later courts described this case
- attorney’s failure to appear at first day of criminal trial due to alleged conflict with another case, coupled with his unsatisfactory explanation for his failure to proceed with trial after being ordered to, treated as a direct contempt
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PARKS, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur in the judgment of the Court that the punishment imposed in this case exceeded the statutory limits. However, I must dissent to whatever the majority opinion is supposed to be overruling in Minter v. State, 765 P.2d 803 (Okl.Cr.1988). In Minter a unanimous Court, that included this writer and Judges Brett and Bussey, held that 21 O.S.Supp.1984, § 566, did not confer jurisdictional power on the courts to punish contempt by imposing payment of litigation costs as part of the punishment.
The majority states that the legislature gave the courts the power to impose sanctions for direct contempt of court in addition to the fine couched in 21 O.S.Supp. 1984, § 566. The majority relies on Section E of 21 O.S.Supp.1984, § 565.1, which states that the judge may impose appropriate sanctions including punishment for contempt. This language necessarily infers that multiple sanctions may be available. However, the crux of the issue is whether the sanction contemplated is appropriate. Certainly punishment for contempt is appropriate and is limited by 21 O.S.Supp. 1984, § 566. Punishment for additional sanctions must therefore lie outside this limiting statute. Nevertheless, assessing the cost of a jury panel is not appropriate in a criminal trial. If it were otherwise there would be no logical end to the litigation costs assessed because an endless number of other costs can be shown to be as “related to the contempt” as jury expense. The judge’s salary, courtroom space, utility costs, and various other “necessary” expenses could also be assessed as litigation costs. Moreover, the majority announces, by judicial fiat, that the lower court must find the exact amount of jury expense that is to be taxed as a sanction. Presumably, any other costs would be subject to the same exactitude rule as the jury expense under this rule. However, determining “exactly” what these other costs amount to and derive from would involve the torture of numbers and language not unlike that required to conclude that these types of costs are appropriate in the first place.
In any event, the majority fails to cite authority or sound reasoning for overturning any part of our previous holding in Minter . Therefore, I respectfully dissent from this part of the decision.