concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)
- finding that trooper engaged in discretionary conduct by stopping plaintiff, concluding that plaintiff had refused to sign traffic citation, and taking her to jail after arrest
- state trooper’s decision to stop appellant and take him to jail required the officer to use personal judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated in part, on other grounds by Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. 433 (2007)
114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998), abrogated in part on other grounds by Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. 433 , 168 P.3d 720
The opinion
*63 Springer, C. J.,
with whom Rose, J., agrees,
dissenting:
Trooper Reyna is not immune from section 1983 liability if a reasonably competent officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the trooper would have concluded that probable cause to arrest appellant pursuant to NRS 484.793 did not exist. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, as we are compelled to do in reviewing a summary judgment, we see the following facts: appellant was not issued a citation, appellant did not refuse to sign a citation, and appellant never saw a citation. Appellant’s husband, who was in the car with appellant at the time of the traffic stop, also stated that appellant was not issued a citation, that she did not refuse to sign, and that she never saw a citation. NRS 484.793 grants a peace officer authority to arrest a person who is issued a traffic citation and refuses to give a written promise to appear in court. See NRS 484.793. If appellant was never issued a traffic citation and did not refuse to give a written promise to appear, then probable cause to arrest her pursuant to this statute did not exist. Thus, a reasonable trooper would not have concluded that probable cause existed to arrest appellant under NRS 484.793. Therefore, appellant has presented specific facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the trooper’s conduct and the circumstances surrounding her arrest. For this reason, I would reverse the order of summary judgment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.