holding as a matter of law that defendant- salesman’s knowing misrepresentations that a used automobile was a one-owner vehicle, that the remaining portion of the original manufacturer’s new-car warranty could be transferred to plaintiff upon the payment of a fee, and that the automobile had not been involved in a wreck constituted unfair or deceptive practices
How later courts described this case
- holding as a matter of law that defendant- salesman’s knowing misrepresentations that a used automobile was a one-owner vehicle, that the remaining portion of the original manufacturer’s new-car warranty could be transferred to plaintiff upon the payment of a fee, and that the automobile had not been involved in a wreck constituted unfair or deceptive practices
- holding that used car salesman’s misrepresentations to buyer that used car had only one owner, that remaining portion of original manufacturer’s new car warranty could be transferred to buyer on payment of fee, and that automobile had not been involved in a wreck violated § 75-1.1
- holding that North Carolina’s UDTPA prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices and that “[p]roof of fraud would necessarily constitute a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts . . . .”
- observing that North Carolina statute is worded similarly to the FTC, meaning that guidance can be drawn from federal interpretation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Huskins
concurring in result.
We have said that punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded ■ against a person “ ‘to punish him for his outrageous conduct.’ ... In some cases, in actions to recover damages for fraud, where punitive damages are asked, it is suggested that a line of demarcation be drawn between aggravated fraud and simple fraud, with punitive damages allowable in the one case and refused in. the other. In a note in 165 A.L.R. 616 , it is said: ‘All that can be said is that to constitute aggravated fraud there must be some additional element of asocial behavior which goes beyond the facts necessary to create a case of simple fraud.’ ” Swinton v. Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723 , 73 S.E. 2d 785 (1953).
In the case before us defendants represented that the car involved was a one-owner car, had been driven only 23,000 miles, had never been wrecked, and that the warranty could be transferred to plaintiff. Plaintiff purchased the vehicle upon *312 those representations. The truth of the matter was that the car was a second-owner vehicle, had been wrecked, had been driven 80,000 miles when plaintiff bought it, and the warranty could not be transferred. When plaintiff discovered the truth and sought to rescind the contract, Toler denied that the car had been wrecked and said plaintiff must have wrecked it himself. In the face of all that, both defendants stipulated at the trial that they knew at the time of the sale that the vehicle had been sold on two previous occasions and had been involved in a wreck prior to the sale to plaintiff. And uncontradicted evidence shows that defendants knew the car had over 80,000 miles on it while telling plaintiff the mileage was only 23,000. In my view such conduct is “outrageous conduct” and contains an additional element of asocial behavior which goes beyond simple fraud and constitutes aggravated fraud. Nothing else appearing, the facts in evidence here are sufficient to warrant the allowance of punitive damages.
I concur in the result reached in this case, however, because G.S. 75-16 is itself punitive in nature and provides for the recovery of damages in treble the amount fixed by the verdict. Having sought and recovered treble damages, plaintiff’s right to punitive damages is thereby excluded. For these reasons I concur in the result reached by the majority.
Justices Lake and Exum join in this concurring opinion.