stating the test for substantial reason as “whether there is a basis in reason connecting the inference [of compliance with the decisional standard] to the facts from which it is derived”
How later courts described this case
- stating the test for substantial reason as “whether there is a basis in reason connecting the inference [of compliance with the decisional standard] to the facts from which it is derived”
- discussing the dif- ference between “legislated organization of local govern- ment and legislated organization of state government which affects local government” of which the former is “addressed to a concern of the state with the structure and procedures of local agencies” and the latter is a substantive statute to be examined for “irreconcilability ‘with the local commu- nity’s freedom to choose its own political form’ ” (quoting LaGrande/Astoria, 281 Or at 156 )
- stating the test as “whether there is a basis in reason connecting the inference [of compliance with the deci-sional standard] to the facts from which it is derived”
- “[T]he court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in drawing an inference, but the court must be satisfied that agency judg- ment has actually been exercised.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DENECKE, C. J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in all parts of the majority opinion by Justice Tanzer except that I limit my concurrence in part II *300 of the majority opinion to the second ground stated in the opinion; that is, that if the state statutory procedure for compulsory arbitration is regarded as requiring a decisional procedure in which the city must participate, it is “justified by a need to safeguard the interests of affected persons in those processes.”
The dissent argues there was no showing of a “need.” I am of the opinion that the existence of the “need” required to permit the state to impose a decisional procedure in which the city must participate need not be shown by the introduction of evidence. In this case it is apparent to me that there is a “need” to substitute compulsory arbitration, or something akin, for the forbidden right to strike to secure reasonable wages and working conditions.
It may be there will be cases involving statutes in which the need for a state-imposed procedure is not apparent and, despite a legislative policy statement of need, we may conclude in such cases that a “need” is not shown.
Peterson, J., joins in this specially concurring opinion.