recognizing that “Texas courts and the Attorney General have consistently recognized that [the exception from disclosure provided by section 552.111] encompasses the common law deliberative process privilege, which protects certain agency communications from discovery” and that the privilege protects predecisional and deliberative communications related to agency’s policymaking
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “Texas courts and the Attorney General have consistently recognized that [the exception from disclosure provided by section 552.111] encompasses the common law deliberative process privilege, which protects certain agency communications from discovery” and that the privilege protects predecisional and deliberative communications related to agency’s policymaking
- concluding that under then-current version of state’s Public Information Act, which neither expressly recognized nor expressly prohibited governmental entity from seeking declaratory relief in response to public records request, municipality was not barred from seeking declaratory relief in response to news agency’s public 8 records request
- concluding that draft prepared by city employee was public information because it was used “in 15 connection with transacting official business” when city manager circulated it to city council and used it to consult with council about how to handle a personnel problem, “a decision involving the City’s official business”
- concluding that draft prepared by city employee was public information because it was used “in connection with transacting official business” when city manager circulated it to city council and used it to consult with council about how to handle a personnel problem, “a decision involving the City’s official business”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice ENOCH, joined by Chief Justice PHILLIPS,
concurring.
The Court today overrules the City of Garland’s motion for rehearing. In this supplemental opinion, I address a point raised by the City that primarily attacks my concurring opinion.
The City argues that the city manager, not the city council, was the “decisionmaker,” and that by presenting the draft document to the city council, he was merely seeking advice about whether to use the document.
That distinction is without a difference. The city manager serves at the pleasure of the city council. 1 He was not asking individual council members what they thought; indeed, he presented the draft document to the city council in session for its comments. The city council used that draft to answer the city manager’s request for advice, which he then acted upon.
I am not persuaded by the City’s attempt to disguise the determinative nature of the council’s input as “advice.” The council hires, fires, and supervises the manager. When the manager seeks guidance from the council in session on an important matter, it would be inaccurate to label either the session merely advisory or the accompanying documents as simply “drafts.” Thus, even if the city’s characterization of the city manager’s role in relation to the council is technically correct, I do not think it controls our interpretation of the statute.
. See Garland City Charter, Art. IV §§ 21(a) & 22.