dissents on other grounds, followed in People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P. 2d 677 (1963) and People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P. 2d 492 (1959); Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 199 P. 2d 897 (1948
How later courts described this case
- dissents on other grounds, followed in People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P. 2d 677 (1963) and People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P. 2d 492 (1959); Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 199 P. 2d 897 (1948
- dissents on other grounds
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Saille
33 Cal.2d 330, 350, 202 P.2d 53 (1949), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Saille, 54 Cal.3d 1103, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588 (1991));
The opinion
EDMONDS, J.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in People v. Danielly, post, p. 362 [ 202 P.2d 18 ], I agree that the testimony of the prison physicians who had Wells under observation just prior to the time of the commission of the acts with which he was charged, was improperly excluded. Evidence tending to prove that a defendant did not have the state of mind which the statute requires as an essential element of a crime should always be admissible upon a *359 plea of not guilty as a defense to the charge. The refusal to admit such evidence allows one to be convicted of the crime defined by section 4500 of the Penal Code without proof of the requisite mental intent specified by the statute and constitutes a denial of due process of law.
As in the case of premeditation and deliberation necessary to establish murder of the first degree (see dissent in People v. Danielly, post, p. 362 [ 202 P.2d 18 ]) the nature of the inquiry into “malice aforethought” calls for the application of a subjective test. When a statute requires a particular intent as an essential element of a crime, the inquiry may include, among other factors, evidence bearing upon the capacity of the mind of the accused. The restriction of the inquiry to the test of the actions of a “reasonable man” subverts the very purpose of the requirement of the specific criminal intent.
The considerations which govern an appellate court in passing upon the prejudicial effect of an erroneous exclusion of evidence are somewhat different from those which apply when evidence is improperly admitted. Clearly, the prejudicial effect of error committed by the exclusion of evidence can be cured where other evidence has been admitted to prove the fact or condition sought to be established (Siebel v. Shapiro, 58 Cal.App.2d 509 [ 137 P.2d 56 ]; Ash v. Soo Sing Lung, 177 Cal. 356 [ 170 P. 843 ]) or where the challenged testimony was later admitted without objection (Callahan v. Marshall, 163 Cal. 552 [ 126 P. 358 ]; Robertson v. Bonelli, 65 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 151 P.2d 307 ]), for, under such circumstances, the question concerns only the effect of the exclusion of evidence additional to that otherwise presented. But where the court, as here, bars a defendant from introducing any medical evidence whatever tending to show either his state of mind or capacity to act maliciously for the purpose of disproving the existence of an element of the crime specified by the statute, the ruling necessarily constitutes a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of section 4% of article VI of the Constitution.
I would reverse the judgment and the order denying a new trial.
Traynor, J., concurred.