holding that landowners and occupiers of land have a “duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises for the protection of lawful visitors.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that landowners and occupiers of land have a “duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises for the protection of lawful visitors.”
- abolishing licensee-invitee distinction but maintaining categories and citing the following cases as doing the same: Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691 (Fla.1973); Jones v. Hansen, 254 Kan. 499, 867 P.2d 303 (1994); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me.1979); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); Heins, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51; Ford v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 118 N.M. 134, 879 P.2d 766 (1994); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D.1977); Ragnone v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 291 Or. 617, 633 P.2d 1287 (1981); Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I.1994); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn.1984); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis.2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975); Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo.1993)
- concluding that “the trichotomy was created to disgorge the jury of some of its power”
- whether a legal duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bennett v. MERCHANDISE MART PROPERTIES, INC., 197 N.C. App. 628 (2009)
The facts in Nelson, however, are distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar.
The opinion
*634 Chief Justice Mitchell
concurring in the result
In the present case the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The majority in the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. I am convinced that a jury could find that plaintiff entered defendants’ premises as an invitee and defendants violated the duty of care owed an invitee. That being the case, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order of summary judgment for defendants. Accordingly, I find it unnecessary for this Court to consider whether our prior holdings in this area of the common law have been erroneous and must be modified. Further, I think it inadvisable to render an opinion of the magnitude of that entered by the majority in this case when, as here, no party has suggested such a modification of the common law and this Court has not had the benefit of briefs and arguments on the issues decided by the majority.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur only in the result reached by the majority.
Justice Lake and Ore join in this concurring opinion.